World Politics

WWII and beyond

Rapallo Treaty (1922) In a surprise move, the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany recognized each other, waived all interstate debts, and agreed to Most Favored Nation status in commerce.  The two isolated states of Europe – the USSR and Germany – were working together.

The Ruhr Invasion: France’s leader Poincare announced that the French Government was going to impose hardship on the German people.  On January 11, 1923, the French army and Belgians marched into the industrial heart of Germany:  Essen, Dusseldorf, Koln, Mainz, Saar, and Aachen were occupied, industrialists were imprisoned, mayors put in jail.

AT THIS POINT German economic life stopped.  Sit down strikes went on through the autumn.  This led to social unrest: Oct. 1923 there was a Communist uprising in Saxony, and Ludendorf joined an ambitious young orator named Adolf Hitler Hitler to try a rightwing putsch in Munich.  .

This continued 1923-24.  France appeared to the world as a "bully", giving France the reputation that Germany had previously had.   The French occupation of the RUHR started to backfire.    The French had to raise taxes to finance occupation, thanks to German strikes.  They had thought that they could milk the area for its riches, but the Germans wouldn't cooperate.

Locarno (1925)   Gustav Stresemann, basically a Monarchist at heart, was a realist.  He decided that if Germany proposed a status quo settlement in Western Europe, including a de-militarized Rhineland, this would improve confidence and might lead to an early end to the occupation of the Rhineland as well as the Ruhr.  The Ruhr occupation ended in 1926, the Rhineland in 1930. 

Locarno was all France could get.  Briand said "oui" after some hesitation.  It was signed in Oct. 1925, spectacular coverage.  Sometimes called the "Rheinland pact".  Guaranteed Belgian and French frontiers, with Britain and Italy as cosponsors.  Mussolini made his first appearance, charmed European statesmen.

To the public, Locarno was the definitive end to World War I.  There was a political return to normalcy, and the Dawes plan was working to stabilize the German economy and pay some reparations to France.  1925-30 was the "Indian Summer" of Europe’s interwar period.  Finally the war was completely behind them, such a mistake would never be made again, it was time to move forward!  Briand and Stresemann even talked about freer trade, and cautious moves to something like what later would become the EU.  The depression ended all of that.  This shows the way in which economic decline and crisis can lead to not only a loss of stability and democracy, but to dangerous extremism.

Then: The depression

1929: US stock market plunge signals the depression, but spreads across Europe.  No apparent way out.  (There was -- Keynes found it, but people didn’t really listen to him yet -- just like they ignored him when he warned about Versailles).  Governments cut spending and hoped that market forces would come to the rescue.  They didn’t.

Germany: Nazi party, which in 1923 during the last economic crisis tried a putsch in Munich, had been losing support.  Their star, an orator with penetrating eyes and an hypnotic style, had been a brief phenom in a publicized trail where he got sent to prison and wrote a book.  Hitler’s Mein Kampf stated the goals of the organization.  But as things got better in the late twenties, people dismissed him.  Then suddenly, with the depression, the public increasingly looked for an alternative. 

Communists: this was the end of capitalism.  Look around!  It’s failing!  Now is the time to grab power!   Nazis and other nationalist groups: fight communism!  Unite for Germany!  Stand up for national pride!   Public: tended more towards the right due to fear of Bolshevism.

German government: Increasingly impotent.  No agreement in the parliament, the country was ruled by emergency decrees from the President.  On the streets: Fighting!  2/3 of the people supported groups opposed to democracy (Communists, Fascists, and Monarchists).  Finally Hindenburg decided to make Hitler Chancellor, hoping the Nazis could form a coalition with the conservatives and other right wing nationalist parties to bring stability to Germany.

Within a year of a half from becoming Chancellor on Jan 30, 1933 Hitler got all power with the Enabling Act after the Reichstag fire of Feb 1933. 

Hitler used that terrorist act – the Reichstag fire – to say that he needed short term emergency powers to secure Germany from communist terrorists and internal threats.  Germany needed a strong firm hand, he said, democracy can come back once the land is secure.  But after the Enabling Act was passed, democracy was dead.

Hindenburg died, and Hitler became President on Aug. 2 1934.  With that, Hitler’s power was undisputed, and the Weimar Republic turned into the Third Reich.  He was supported because he was successful.  German economy grew, Germans were feeling proud of their country again...yet he put forth his racial theories, and Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum made war inevitable.  Most Germans didn’t want war -- they just followed their leader, trusting he knew what was best.  Good economic times can give anybody support.

Turning point one: Rheinland militarization.  1936, Hitler broke the Versailles treaty by marching into the Rheinland.  That was an industrial area of Germany which had been kept de-militarized by the Versailles treaty, and France had even occupied it for awhile in the 20's.  Hitler decided to militarize it, without agreement.  A bold act -- though he told his generals to turn back if they met resistance.  They didn’t.  The treaty was dead (many bits had been dropped before, but this was the nail in the coffin -- it also showed Hitler that a quick move could work, no one would stand up to him).   France was humiliated by the Rheinland militarization, and Hitler continued in the next couple years to engineer other peaceful foreign policy successes.  Germans FINALLY had a leader they could be proud of!  Or so they thought.  Look at it from their perspective - He got victories for Germany, kept them out of war, had the economy moving...what could be better?

And the Jews?  Not taken seriously.  Britain even sent a ship back from Palestine (due to fears of the Palestinians that these immigrants may try to form a state, which they would see as European colonialism).  Also a ship which made it to Havana was sent back because the US and Cuba didn’t want any Jewish immigrants.  Most of the people on these ships ended up dying in the holocaust; no one took the issue of Nazi anti-Semitism seriously until after the war.   Perhaps the holocaust could have been avoided if people had made the Jews an issue earlier, and accepted them into their country. 

Britain: The Conservative government of Neville Chamberlain saw Hitler as dangerous, but more important: they had a fear of Bolshevism.  A strong Germany -- even under Hitler -- might help stop the spread of Communism.    Still, by 1938 most British thought war SOMETIME with Germany was probably inevitable, but that for a few years at least Britain would not be ready, they needed time to build up.  Some also thought it was still possible to smooth Hitler’s rough edges and bring him into the family of European nations.  Chamberlain had what seemed like a brilliant scheme to try to tame Hitler, but at the same time win time to prepare for war: appeasement.

Chamberlain’s policy: Appease legitimate German interests after Versailles.  Logical: appease legitimate German interests to get them into the system rather than opposed to the system.  It would have worked with anyone but Hitler. .  Don’t misunderstand appeasement; most people who criticize appeasement don’t know what the real policy actually was.   The military told Chamberlain, who actually thought war likely, that they wouldn’t be ready until 1943, so he had to buy time.  But he also wanted to make sure they didn’t rush to an unwanted war like WWI.   The policy did buy some time for Britain to prepare for war, but Chamberlain took it too far, in retrospect, in dealing with Hitler over the Sudeutenland in Czechoslovakia. 

Hitler claimed he was like a Bismarck – he undid the injustice of Versailles, and now would work to maintain a Metternichian status quo.  But he was lying – and fooling a lot of people.  He laid out a war plan to his generals as early as 1935.

Hitler’s demand seemed reasonable: let the people of the Sudeutenland choose if they want to be German or Czech.  That is self-determination, as Wilson promised in his 14 points.  It seemed like the right thing to do.  Czechoslovakia was artificial anyway.  BUT...the French had built a defense line to protect Czechoslovakia and prevent Germany from being able to expand East.  But that line was located almost entirely in the Sudeutenland!   If Germany had attacked, it would have hurt Nazi war machine, especially in 1938.  As it was, they occupied the Sudeutenland peacefully, and then in March 1939 simply took the rest of Czechoslovakia.  By that time, everyone pretty much knew war was inevitable.

Hitler the Statesman apparently could do no wrong.  His economy was doing better than most, he was achieving peaceful foreign policy success, Versailles was gone, and fascism on the rise throughout Europe.  The main enemy was Stalin.  Britain refused to be too anti-Germany because of fear of Bolshevism.  (One member of Chamberlain’s own party -- that manic-depressive alcoholic with rude manners, a genius by the name of Winston Churchill, tried to warn people, but no body took him seriously).

Then suddenly things changed:

HITLER-STALIN PACT: 1939, non-aggression, shocked the world.  The division of Poland was decided with this treaty as well, though that was not made public (Stalin and Hitler agreed to split Poland).  With democracy all but dead, WWII started.  First Poland, then France fell in 1940.  War’s fatal day was on July 22, 1941 when Hitler invaded Russia.  Russia would later be the main power to defeat Nazi Germany.

WWII:  Hitler and Stalin: horrid examples of the worst in leadership.  The people killed were unbelievably high.  War: 20 million Russians.  Stalin killed maybe 20 million more.  Hitler: holocaust -- 11 million killed, mostly Jews, Socialists, Gypsies, gays, and anyone deemed “undesirable” was simply eliminated.  Crimes: a result of dehumanization of society.

The war also shows also the importance of the individual level of analysis.  Look at Hitler’s blunder -- the blunder of the century, or series of blunders.  Not defeating Britain and rebuilding, but instead being consumed with hatred for Russia.  Going to help Italy with Greece, and then going on to crush Yugoslavia even though there was no real reason -- just Hitler’s rage.  (The Serbs especially fought hard, making it more difficult for Hitler to get his attack off on time).  Then when the attack was postponed six weeks to June 22, 1941, perhaps the most important day in the history of the 20th century, he failed to change the plan to provide cold weather gear and equipment.  The result: when winter came the Germans were four weeks from achieving their goal.  From then on, it was only a matter of time until they lost.  Of course, if it hadn’t been that blunder, another may have happened.  There is no way Germany could have conquered the world, and like Napoleon, Hitler’s appetite would have probably driven him further until he sooner or later would stumble.  But his own mistakes made it sooner rather than later.

Stalin: killed 20 million, his purges and use of slave labor represent ruthless cunning, yet with Hitler he was fawning and unable to recognize the one man whose evil mirrored his own.  Partially, Stalin was a bit more rational.  He was driven by a cold calculation for power, not an insane rage like Hitler.  Stalin’s insanity was one of paranoia, and in the case of Hitler the real danger was such Stalin could not take to accept it, and thus discounted all the information that came to him.  His purges were a primary problem -- besides getting rid of the top general staff, it made those who remained so fearful of Stalin they didn’t behave like a military leadership should.  The Germans used all that to their advantage.  Before the war they even sent communiques to Russian Generals “thanking” them vaguely.  The Russian Generals had no idea what it referred to so they ignored it.  But Stalin’s spies would see all the mail coming in, and report it, convincing Stalin his generals were working with the enemy.  In each case, psychological factors shaped the outcome, even if the conditiosn and circumstances were from outside the individual’s own power.  Fate mixed with will.

Ultimately, of course, Hitler was defeated, Germany totally destroyed, and WWII ended a period of barbarism in Europe which saw scores of millions butchered, two of the deadliest wars in history, and in the far East, Japan, the first use of an atomic weapon to target a civilian population and create massive death and disability.    But once the war was over, then what?

Europe in 1945:

The  Soviet/American alliance had been seen as the key to victory over Germany, and the only way to set up a solid peace.   There was optimism this alliance would continue.  Alas, it was not to be:

   1.  The Alliance had always been troubled.

       a.  The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 led to war, many felt Hitler would not have started war without that agreement.

       b.  The Soviets were angered by the lack of a US/Brit offensive until 1944.  20 million Soviets dead; the West got involved heavy duty only when the Soviets had basically won the war already (note: Hitler would have lost anyway, but it would have been messy and long).

Truman and Churchill both have been quoted as saying that it was all right with them if the Germans and Russians killed each other off.  Not many Americans died in WWII, but 20 million Russians did.  They literally did the bleeding that won the war, the U.S. supplied the high-tech and the money and industry.  By the time the U.S. did attack France in June 1944, the Soviets had started moving forward towards Berlin.

       c.  Stalin's paranoia, fear of isolation.  He remembered attacks by Poland in 1921, and the fighting of West in Russian civil war.  Stalin believed the USSR needed a buffer.

       d.  Different ideologies.  Less important at first, Stalin not really ideological, more realpolitik.

       e.  Atomic bomb secrets, U.S. use of the bomb.  Stalin's spies had informed him long before its use that it was being developed, and that the British were involved.  Yet nothing was said to him, and at that time, the Russians and Americans were allies.  When Truman finally told him, Stalin gave no visible response, and Churchill thought that showed how dumb Stalin was, not even reacting to the gravity of it.  Well for Stalin, it was old news.

    2.  EUROPE in shambles, and then suffered a hard winter.

Realism emerged from the dust of WWII as a reaction to how idealism and legalism seemed to fail in the thirties.  When appeasement failed and WWII came anyway, people argued that giving Hitler Czechoslovakia helped pave the way for the ease in which Germany took France and Poland.  Chamberlain resigned replaced by Churchill who, while from the same party as Chamberlain, had been warning about the Germans for some time.

This had an impact on American policy makers in two ways:

1.  They saw how idealism -- doing the right thing -- and legalism -- recognizing self-determination -- led to a disaster.  This led them to argue that states can't be led down a certain path simply because the legal rights say it's the proper path.  Rather, the political ramifications involving what that does to the power of the states involved is more important.  This leads to the advent of REALISM -- which we discussed at the end of Unit One.

2.  They learned that appeasement doesn't work.  They overlearned this.  Appeasement as the British crafted it (to appease legitimate interests and make Germany a status quo power) would have been a good policy for almost anyone but Hitler.  By learning it never works, they ignored that it might work with others in other situations.  Hitler was, to put it mildly, rather unique.  Chamberlain tried appeasement because intransigence had helped lead to WWI.  He learned that flexible concern for interests of other states is necessary.  His failure caused others to learn the opposite lesson.  Both were overlearned.