World Politics
Some Philosophers/Historians associated with political realism:
Thucydides: his account of the Peloponnesian War is still read in most graduate programs as a ‘starting point’ for the study of international affairs, even if the concept of ‘international’ is more recent, the term coined apparently by Jeremy Bentham. He focuses on relative power and the ability of the strong to determine how the system operates.
Niccolo Machiavelli: he argued that the end justifies the means in politics in divided Italy, noting that it is better for a prince to be feared and respected than loved. Machiavelli wrote in an era when Italy was being ravaged by raids from Spain and the German states, and he yearned for someone who would unify Italy and protect it. He thought that the only way to do that was to have a hard nosed focus on power and strength. The ends justify the means: the end is security of the territory and stability. It may take lying, killing, deception, and ruthlessness to achieve it, but without security and stability the results are much worse. He drew this conclusion in part because of his experience as a Florentine diplomat dealing with a problem of gangs in competition in Pistoia (about 45 minutes from Florence). There the Florentines chose not to intervene, thinking it wrong to try to control another territory, and the result was atrocities and mass slaughter. Machiavelli’s power politics wasn’t evil or heartless; to him it was actually pragmatic – you have to act that way in order to achieve security and stability, and that ultimately benefits society more than the chaos which idealistic choices might yield.
Thomas Hobbes: Life is nasty brutish and short. Humans are animals, driven by emotions which can be civilized and tamed, but not undone. Hence you need a strong system of rules in order to maintain piece. From here realists get the emphasis on anarchy being a self-help system with interest defined as power as necessary; human nature prevents all of us just ‘getting along.’ Also, Hobbes notion of an elite who can understand and create a stable system helps support the realist ideal of elite led rational foreign policy.
Kal von Clausewitz: Here is a view of realism that would later be rejected: war is politics by other means. Clausewitz is most known for focusing on power and ho w it is used, as well as strategy.
Hans Morgenthau: The founder of modern political realism, disagreed with Clausewitz. For Morgenthau war is the failure of politics, Morgenthau focused primarily on diplomacy as the best means to solve problems. That didn’t deny the possibility of war, and necessitated a ‘peace through strength’ approach. For Morgenthau and most modern realists, the goal of politics should be PEACE. It isn’t peace at all costs, you don’t sacrifice essential national interests for peace, but it is a states rational interest to try to come up with a peaceful settlement of problems. Again, the view that realists are war-acceptant is overstated. They are willing to use the threat of military force, and under some conditions see that their efforts have failed (usually if one of the actors is being irrational and a solution to a problem cannot be reached) and war is the only option.
Note: realism is not necessarily more realistic than the alternates. Realism is a perspective that got its name because the people developing the theory believed it more realistic. By rejecting idealism, some people think realists like war, or dislike international law and cooperation. That is also false, realists simply believe peace is more likely following the route they pursue, they don’t believe cooperation is achievable in the way idealists want.
Fundamental assumptions of realism:
1. States are main components of the system, and can be treated as ‘fiction people’.
2. States interact in a system that is anarchic, meaning there is no central authority. This necessitates the self-help principle.
3. Human nature is self-interested and myopic. This makes it difficult to build cooperative structures because people have an incentive to cheat out of self-interest.
4. Humans have the capacity for rationality, and that capacity is what can allow statespeople to construct a system that can peacefully deal with conflicts of interest.
Fundamental principles:
1. Sovereignty is the organizing principle of the international system. Sovereignty is both internal (states control what goes on within their borders) and external (states can act on the ‘world stage’ by interaction with other states). This implies the principle of territoriality.
2. Interest is defined as power. States always are interested in maximizing power relative to other states. Absolute power is less important than relative power. It is better to lose some power if your opponent loses more, than to gain some if your opponent gains even more.
3. Rational states recognize that maximizing relative power is most likely when the basic character of the system is maintained. This means support of the systemic status quo, where all other states have a ‘right to exist,’ and a state eschews attempts to take over or destroy other states.
4. Rational states recognize that states attempting imperial policies are inherently dangerous to each state’s relative power, and that such states or alliances must be countered.
5. Finally, absent an effective world government, human nature makes conflict inevitable in the international system.
Elite vs. the masses: Realists are often criticized for having an elitist approach to international relations. Often this is a disdain for the masses penchant either to criticize a policy because it is too hard nosed on the one hand (over sentimentality), or to support warlike policies on the other (emotional jingoism). For the realist the masses do not have the knowledge and understanding required to act rationally in the international system, and thus their desires for state foreign policy reflect myopic self-interest and greed. A rational leader of a state can recognize that, for instance desire for revenge due to an insult is irrational, and no reason for war. A rational leader can recognize that just because a state violates human rights, that does not mean war against that state is justified. A rational leader might recognize that even though innocent people are hurt, support for a particular military campaign or dictatorial regime is necessary.
In short, tough decisions require that rationality not sentimentality be the guide. The public often errors not only by being too sentimental, but also letting patriotism lead them to believe their state can and should act aggressively. Hence realists do not think democracy helps in creating foreign policy, and would prefer to keep it in the purview of experts.
Moral/cultural relativism: Though realists are not necessarily relativist in regards to personal choices in daily life, they argue that in the international system one must accept that other states will have their own way of doing things. This necessitates accepting that a state may be communist, fascist, Islamic, Hindu, democratic, etc., and as long as they aren’t trying to alter the system you can deal with them. Realists like Kennan and Kissinger were less intent on battling the ideology of communism than looking at the two sides as power blocks opposing each other. This is why Reagan opposed Kissinger’s detente, Reagan had a mix of idealism with realism.
The ends justify the means: State actions are not moral or immoral, but amoral. As long as the state is acting rationally to support its interests and stop potential revolutionary states (those threatening the status quo), one cannot criticize a state for behaving immorally. There is no agreed upon international ‘morality,’ that is considered a domestic matter (with each state, due to the principle of sovereignty, choosing its own). This is obviously tied to the relativism discussed above. Note a problem in this: There seems to be an inherent moral code within realism: maintaining the peace is a primary goal, as well as maintaining the system and stopping revolutionary powers. It is not seen as legitimate to try to expand or take over the system, though expanding influence is acceptable. Is all that really stem from a rational attempt to maximize relative power, or do you think realists are simply smuggling in some moral principles under the guise of ‘rationality’?
Diplomacy: For realists, diplomacy is the ideal. Diplomats should be able to solve every problem. That doesn’t mean they always compromise fairly. The compromise reflects POWER and national interest. A state whose essential interests are in play and has the power to protect them will not give in to a less powerful state. They will reach a settlement that reflects both states level of interests and potential ability to defend those interests.
In diplomacy the same principles apply accept the diplomats are like ‘lawyers for the state’ and the factors that matter are state power, bargaining strategies, expectations, intensity of national interest. A weak state will take the ‘best deal possible.’ A breakdown in diplomacy will not usually lead to war, only in cases where states see their essential interests at stake and no agreement possible will war occur. Most realists believe all rational state diplomats should be able to solve every conflict of interest. IF they understand the distribution of power and the relative importance of the issues, they should rationally recognize a proper solution. It will be in favor of the state with more power, will not fundamentally hurt the status quo, and be good enough so as not to endanger the basic interests of the state with less power.
War comes about when either a weak state refuses to accept its position and tries to expand, or if a powerful state decides to throw that power around in order to get all it wants, even at the expense of the systemic status quo or the essential interests of less powerful states.
Alliances and the Balance of power
Since more than one state is involved in the system, alliances form naturally as weaker states try to counter the pressure from larger states. Ideally, alliances should form a balance of power whereby each side recognizes that war is irrational and victory uncertain. In such a case they have the incentive to come up with a solution to any problem they face. Alliances will often shift in order to maintain the balance of power; when the balance of power is shifted dramatically to one side, then war is more likely.
Bi-polar: System is led by two states, or ‘poles’ who build alliances. The Cold War was a bipolar system.
Multi-polar: A number of states with different interests interact, with the balance emerging from different alliance blocs, with states often shifting between blocks.
Liberalism
Liberalism is the main alternate to realism, growing from idealism. Idealism had its roots in the philosophies of people like Immanual Kant and John Locke – how self-interest can lead to cooperation, and how democracy would make war less likely.
Idealists argued that war happens because of the anarchy realists see, but that anarchy isn’t necessary. The Security Dilemma (the fact that your effort to gain security automatically makes other states less secure) leads to arms races as each state tries for total security – thereby making other states insecure. This leads to wars nobody wants. It should be replaced by collective security.
Assumption: most states don’t want war, and don’t want to spend a lot of money on arms. Yet they do out of a perceived necessity. If they could work together they could say "an attack on any of us is an attack on all," and not only would they have less fear, but they wouldn’t spend as much or fall in to the trap of a security dilemma. Leaders would create international law to settle disputes, and soon world governance would look more like national governance, with police enforcement the norm rather than wars over power.
Idealism was not accepted by most leaders. It never really failed, though it never was compelling enough for states to try – they feared being played for the sucker, weren’t convinced other states would stand up for them, and ultimately the post-WWI effort would fall apart.
Yet at its core, idealism had an economic essence. Norman Angell argued in The Great Illusion that war really wasn’t likely due to economic ties between great powers. War would be so economically irrational that it could not be chosen. He was right in part – breaking the economic links through war was irrational and costly – but wrong in another part. His book came out in 1913, a year before WWI. That caused him to be ridiculed, yet his argument was a nascent argument of what today gets called globalization: economic links alter political reality, and make military power less rational or effective.
Core ideas of liberalism:
1. The international system is a system where power politics and traditional authoritarian approaches to politics makes conflict more likely.
2. If market economics and democratic systems were in place, war would be less likely since economies would be linked (war would hurt all), and in democracies thugish leaders can’t simply will war on populations and stay in power.
3. The goal of international relations is to promote and support democracy and market economics, even if that means changing the status quo (though primarily by peaceful means, war is still to be avoided for most liberals).
4. Realism is an outdated theory that describes the kind of thinking that led Europe to two world wars, the US has promoted liberalism since WWII.
From idealism to liberalism: Liberalism can be called idealism from below. Whereas idealists saw diplomats making agreements to overcome the anarchic state system, liberals see international organizations and agreements coming from demands by powerful economic actors, such as major banks and corporations, whose interests cross borders. They are hindered by political rivalries, and would prefer an open, free market. They want to eliminate uncertainty, and thus prefer rules be set which apply across borders.
In the 1960s liberal economic theory dominated, but realist international relations theory dominated talk about super power politics and the like. Diplomacy and realism was "high politics," while economics was "low politics." You could get trade and cooperation in the West, according to realists, because with the Cold War the dominate theme, economics just wasn’t important enough to really take seriously. The US was a hegemon, and thus could enforce free trade and cooperation in the West, realists argued (hegemonic stability theory). If the US weren’t there, power politics and division would cause such cooperation to dissipate.
In 1976 Keohane and Nye publish a book "Power and Interdependence," where they lay out their theory of complex interdependence, arguing that: a) realism is becoming obsolete; b) liberalism is a better approach; and c) this has ramifications for how we approach international relations. This argument modified traditional liberalism by emphasizing international institutions as facilitated global free trade and cooperation – this approach has been labeled neo-liberalism.
They weren’t explicitly anti-realist in their book. Rather, they said that
realists need to come to grips with the impact of economics and especially
economic interdependence on power relations. If two countries are
interdependent, then the traditional way to look at competition as a zero-sum
game is obsolete. Moreover, they argued that war and military conflict would be
even MORE costly since it wouldn’t only destroy people and things, but would
damage the entire economic systems of both or all states involved. This makes
military power less important than the past, and economic links a stronger
variable.
1980’s: From Complex Interdependence to Globalization
Globalization slowly started to be used instead of complex interdependence, as it reflects both that interdependence, and the growing variety of ramifications from it.
At base neo-liberals agree with realists that state interests can stymie what interdependence should bring about – free trade and the collective good of all. Unlike realists, they are relatively optimistic that the development of strong and stable international institutions can prevent this from happening.
REGIMES: One thing they point to is the importance of shared norms and principles in the international system. Realists assume a self-interested negative human nature, liberals see self-interest and rationality in human nature. They are more confident that states and leaders can use their reason to see the benefits of a liberal approach and, if confident that they won’t be played for the sucker, they’ll gladly engage in building institutions that will enforce fair cooperation and better outcomes for all. If some states try to go against the rules, other states can "punish" them in a way.
Liberalism is really strong in describing the industrialized north, but has a severe weakness when applied to the south. Also note the critique that even in the north neo-liberalism emphasizes business and financial interests at the neglect of workers.
Now with these two basic theoretical approaches in place as our theoretical starting point, let’s turn to the historical development of the international system.