World Politics
February 29, 2008

The Breakdown of the Metternich system

Still, though the system was crisis prone after 1870, Metternich’s basic system continued to function for over forty more years. Partially it was due to the ingenious gamesmanship of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who promised contradictory things and lied convincingly in a mastery of a diplomatic game that started to be based more on deceit and conniving than the diplomatic honor that Metternich originally intended. Bismarck’s reason for his games: he knew that war was possible, and it could put Germany at risk. He even figured where it was likely to begin, an an area called the Balkans.

Yet rather than the diplomatic concert of Europe, international relations became a game of power politics: maps and territory was bartered back and forth, and alliances and promises were made in order to promote national interest and maintain a stable system in a conflictual world.

Some: the Metternich system and the Concert of Europe get more credit than they deserve. Many believe that the real reason why Europe was so peaceful generally during the century before WWI was because Europe was actively engaged in conquest elsewhere – they were conquering the planet!

Colonialism had been around for centuries, but by the mid-19^th century it had became a land grab where almost the whole planet was being divided. Even places like China which remained nominally independent found its ability to act constrained by British power. The French and the British were the main colonizers in this era, but even states like Belgium and the Netherlands got into the picture. Germany had very limited colonies due to its late unification (Prussia didn’t really have the capacity to try to gain colonies), and Austria was too preoccupied with keeping the empire together. Many believe Germany tried to get Britain and France to think colonially because that kept them as rivals to each other, and they didn’t compete against Germany on the continent.

The rise of capitalism fed a desire for markets and cheap resources. A belief in Social Darwinism convinced Europeans that they had to expand to survive, and that they were the superior people. Like all large empires, it was brief. No sooner did colonialism peak around 1890 than did it start to erode, with independence granted to virtually all colonies after WWII. But the ‘golden age’ of the Metternich era really only lasted until 1848.

1896: Germany announced that it was going to become a world power. This was not surprising. The Germans wanted to emulate others, many saw their economic health tied towards such expansion. Max Weber said that the Germans needed a world empire, or else the national unification would be seen as a "childish prank done in old age." Economists argued they needed to secure markets and resources.

Admiral von Tirpitz: Around 1896 the Kaiser ready a book called The Influence of Sea Power in History, by Alfred Thayer Mahan. This shaped the opinions of naval strategists, and unfortunately for German leaders, they believed that the book was correct. (a false belief for Germany) The book argued:

1) Sea power had been important in the growth of the Dutch and British empires. This was hardly a revelation. But the book persuasively argued that sea power was the only element, the "key to everything." This was wrong.

2) Book argued that firepower was the most important element in naval warfare, and it was more important than speed. Thus battleships and the like were the most important ships to have. Tirpitz and Wilhelm II read Mahan, and realized that Germany industry, newer and more efficient that Brit industry, could build ships fast, so fast that no one would realize what was happening. Indeed, the British first called the German navy the "Kaiser's rubber duck."

FLAW: The Germans never expected to catch the British, but did believe that their navy would be strong enough to force the British to make an alliance, since they assumed that the British would continue to have potential enemies in France and Russia. They naively believed these things wouldn't change. They also didn't realize that the Brits were courting the Japanese and Americans, and the German fleet would end up useless.

The Road to World War I:

Pre-war conditions

1. The power politics in the Metternich system required a diplomatic elite to communicate well and solve problems. Ironically, democracy and ‘power to the people’ destroyed this, as soon populist leaders and movements used nationalism much like Napoleon did. Diplomats and leaders became more nationalist than European, and soon the power politics game had force more important than diplomacy. That was not Metternich’s intention! Bismarck even used this to start his 1870 war with France. He manufactured a telegram leak to the press to make it appear that the Prussian King had insulted France when he really had not (the King didn’t want war as much as Bismarck did). The leak caused Napoleon III to declare war on Prussia, and allow Bismarck to get his war and appear the victim at the same time. Clearly, the public had an impact, not just the elites.

2. Yellow journalism. People thought that democracy would end war since once people could read they’d educate themselves and vote out warriors who would use them as pawns. But once they could read they found papers that would print rabble rousing nationalist drivel, claims the other side was doing horrid things, theories that one’s own side is unfairly treated or needs revenge of some sort. It sold papers! It got the public aroused! People started to want conflict.

3. The end of colonial expansion – as noted above..

4. Bad leadership. The Kaiser was arrogant, and believed Germany so dominant on Europe that he basically bullied and took unilateral actions which ultimately pushed away allies and made rivals convinced Germany was dangerous. Mis-communication and poor choices by decision makers in just about every state, though, contributed to the crisis by 1914.

5. The systemic and perhaps most important cause: the fall of the Ottomann Empire. Turkey held a huge empire, but by the 1800s it was sick, riddled with corruption, tyrannical, had little economic production, was very weak, but somehow held on. As it started to collapse, it was too weak to hold on to its European holdings in the Balkans. The Ottoman’s had defeated the Kingdom of Serbia at the battle of Kosovo in 1389 to take over the place. (The Serbs continued to maintain a separate identity during the Ottoman’s reign, giving Kosovo a mythical status as something to win back from the Turks and then never ever to surrender as it represented the soul of Serbia)

In its wake, the retreat of the Ottoman Empire left a number of small regions: Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Macedonia. As the map shows, only Serbia and Bulgaria had states, the other regions were mostly in Austrian hands and thus the Serbs, whose purpose was to create a southern Slavic empire (Yugo-Slavia) were at odds with the Austrians.

In a world of power politics, this created something dangerous: a power vacuum. Not only that, but this power vacuum was one culturally split between three worlds. The Christian Orthodox world of the Slavs, led by Russia, was represented by the Serbs, who saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the region. The Roman Catholic western Balkans, more closely tied with Austria, had the Croats and Slovenians. And the Ottomans during their rule had converted many slavs to Islam, creating Muslim communities throughout the region. Not only was there a power vacuum, but different cultures with different religions and even languages were living side by side. That is an equation for disaster, especially when big powers on the outside want to cynically use the region to expand their own power. (Le plus la change, le plus c’est les memes choses)

World War I:

Austria - they wanted to expand influence, show itself as a major power. Metternich feared liberalism because he knew Austria was a multiethnic state (the Austro-Hungarian Empire) that relied on a strong Monarchy to survive (it includes much of what is now eastern Europe south of Poland). After Metternich and then the loss of northern Italy (Venice, etc.), Austria was seen increasingly as a minor power. BUT, they figured, if they could establish power in the Balkans, they could re-assert their world role. Therefore they worked with the Bosnians, and others of Roman Catholic religion (Croatians, etc.).

Russia - also weak, they had lost war with Japan, and suffered internal difficulties. They hoped to show their power if they could expand their influence in the Balkans, working with their fellow orthodox slavs, the Serbs The Serbs saw themselves as the true descendents of the original Slavs who lost at Kosovo five hundred years earlier.

Ironically, both Austria and Russia had the same problem that the Ottomans had -- they were out of touch with the modern democratic capitalist world of the West and holding on to a conservative monarchical rule. They hoped that if they could expand where the Ottoman’s left, they could regain power. It was probably a futile hope from the start.

World War I and the end of the Second Reich

WWI started out as a very optimistic time for many Germans. As even the SPD rank and file supported the war, the divisions which were threatening the authoritarian regime seemed to be healed by a desire to protect Germany from external opponents.

A militarist attitude prevailed, the idea that fighting together was heroic and right, the spirit of Germany. That seemed prevalent, and perhaps helps explain what would come after the defeat -- the attitude was squashed, but not the desire for that feeling of nationalist pride and unity, and the power that can come with a joining of wills.

The path towards war in the Balkans: The details may be confusing, but the bottom line isn’t. The Ottoman Empire was declining, and leaving the Balkans in flux. Both Russia and Austria wanted to control the Balkans, believing that would revive their flagging empires. Russia was working through Serbia, which had come to be the strongest of the Slavic states in the Balkans by 1914. Austria had bought Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Ottomans, and controlled areas in the north (Croatia and Slovenia). It was widely known that the power stronger of Austria vs. Serbia (a proxy for Russia) would determine the future of the Balkans. What wasn’t known was that this dispute would hurl Europe into a brutal war.

1912: the Italians declared war on the Ottoman Empire, deciding they could expand their power by exploiting the weakness of the Ottomans. By early 1912 the Italians started to grab islands in the Agean sea, bombing Beirut. The "Young Turks" decided to make a deal with the Italians -- with problems going on the Balkans, the Ottomans did not want double trouble.

However,, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria, seeing the Italian success, decided they could do the same thing. They formed an alliance, The Balkan League which was blessed by Russia. Russia considered the League defensive, but it was not -- they declared war on Turkey in October 1912. They won.

At the peace conference to end that war, Italy and Austria did not want Serbia to have an outlet on the Adriatic, but Russia did. British Foreign Minister Grey and German Chancel Bethmann-Hollweg told the Austrians to accept that Serbia had won, and they told the Russians to make Serbia moderate its claims. This averted a crisis, and allowed the birth of modern Albania, in May 1913.

This London conference neglected Macedonia, however -- Serbia occupied it, although Bulgaria had done the lion's share of the fighting. Bulgaria was upset.

June 1913 -- Bulgaria mobilized: Greece, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey fought against it. Bulgaria lost a short war ending July 31. The balance of power in Balkans was shifting more towards Serbia.

Serbia looked towards Bosnia, which they felt should be part of a southern slavic state (Yugoslavia) dominated by Serbia. Bosnia, however, was controlled by Austria.

A new tactic: terrorism

Terrorism was used by Serb groups against Austria, and ultimately it was a terrorist act that started a chain of events that led to WWI.

The group "black hand," a Serb terrorist organization, assassinated Austrian Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 to show them Bosnia was not safe for Austrians. Franz Ferdinand had hoped to convince the Bosnians to accept a kind of autonomy in the Empire, ending the allure for them to try to break away and join Serbia. The Serbs saw this as a threat, as in reality their desire for rule would probably take more power from the local leaders than the increasingly decentralized Austrian approach. The world was sympathetic to the Austrians after that attack, and that gave the Austrians an idea. Austria wanted revenge and a chance to gain the upperhand over Serbia, and asked the Germans if they would support their attempt to "teach Serbia a lesson."

Kaiser William II -- on July 5: Told Austria to do something to teach the Serbs a lesson, but do it quickly. Bethmann said the same thing on July 6. The Germans envisioned a quick first strike, but the Austrian government unable to mobilize quickly -- and its political system was slow (Hungarian opposition – pacifist feelings). But, what the Kaiser and Bethmann had done was give Austria a blank check.

For Bethmann Hollweg, German Chancellor, it was a calculated risk. A quick victory would shift the balance in the Balkans back to Austria, and the chance of total war was seen as slight. Also, he was in a fatalistic mood at the time (had just lost his wife).

23 July 1914 -- the Serbs received an ultimatum which was grotesquely unfair, and hadn’t even been looked at by the Germans (who were expecting something more reasonable – the Kaiser wanted Austria to have the upper hand over Russia, but he didn’t want a war). The Austrians said the Serbs had to do everything they demanded or they would attack. It was an ultimatum the Serbs could not accept since it in essence robbed them of their sovereignty. Still, the Serbs said yes to just about everything except the most obtrusive provisions denying Serbian sovereignty (free access of Austrian police in Serbia, not limited by Serb law). Even then some Serbs wanted to give in, recognizing that they couldn’t fight Austria. But, pushed by pro-Serb pan-Slavic forces in Russia, the Russian Czar ordered a partial mobilization of Russian forces, something which convinced the Serbs not to give in on the final point.

25 July - partial mobilization begins in Russia. Mobilization is when you get your armies ready for war. This was starting to get out of control, even though most leaders didn’t think a war was likely.

France and Russia had a secret treaty whereby they promised to support each other in case of a war, and even their mobilizations coincided. Russia had to mobilize early due to the backward state of its armed forces; the French were forced to start preparations as well. The Germans saw this, and decided they’d best mobilize too -- no one wanted to be left out.

The leaders of Europe saw a Balkan crisis brewing...yet again...and most figured it would work itself out peacefully as the others had. This one was different though.

France and Germany: had long considered a war between their states as inevitable for the future. When Germany beat France in 1870 they took two French states, Alsace and Lorraine. These two states were annexed even against the will of Bismarck since the German military wanted something for its trouble of winning a war. This created France desire for revenge, they could never be friends with Germany or really at peace until they got Alsace and Lorraine back. The Germans knew that France would someday want to fight them, and probably would get Russia as an ally. For years they had been planning for this kind of war. With the mobilizations occurring, German generals decided now was the time the war was likely.

The German Schlieffen Plan was then pulled out of moth balls. The Schlieffen plan was designed to allow Germany to win a war by first defeating France, and then turn and take care of Russia. It was detailed, and required precise execution. It also had one essential component: a belief that whomever struck first would win. : Schlieffen originally wanted 6/7 of army, or 3,125,000 soldiers, to wheel through Belgium, and then turn south towards Paris. After victory, Germany would turn against Russia. Speed would be the key to everything.

July 29: The British fleet went on alert, and the Kaiser started to get nervous. The Austrian assault on Serbia continued, as the Austrians were bombing Belgrade. Germany’s Generals wanted to attack - speed is everything!!! Remember: Militarism and "patriotism" were rampant, especially in Germany - this helped lead to war.

Famous dictate: people fight the last war. In this case, the Franco-Prussian, Austro-Prussian, and Italian unification wars made people think quick strike victories were the norm. They should have looked across the ocean to the US civil war, THAT had given a sign of what war was going to be like. But they expected a lighting quick war like in 1871. With Russia weak, they figured both France and Russia would collapse, Austria would establish itself in the Balkans (again: Austria was Germany’s main ally), and they would be dominant in Europe. The Generals pushed the Kaiser to give the OK to start the war. The Kaiser was getting cold feet, however.

A quick war expected, timing was everything. Once started, there would be no turning back!!

31 July: 3:55 Am: French mobilization

4:00 Am: German mobilization

The Kaiser still doesn't want war, and tells his Generals to turn the trains around.

But this can't be done, Moltke argued, and Germany crossed into Belgium...(they went through Belgium, which was neutral, to save time so they could more quickly defeat France). Of course they could have turned the trains around, Moltke was lying. The military wanted the war, and not even the Emperor would be able to stand in their way.

So the Metternich system collapsed completely, Europe’s peace was broken, and they would soon find themselves in a war with levels of suffering and destruction they had not imagined before hand.