Afghanistan, Terrorism, and the future
On the news last week there were stories about how the Taliban and Al Qaeda are advancing in Afghanistan, aided by the Iraq war which apparently has helped rather than hurt al qaeda. So what is going on there, and what is the role of terrorism?
1. Afghanistan : Demographic and Geographic details
First, Afghanistan is a cross point between different civilizations. Asia lies to the East, Persia and the Arab world to the West, and India to the south. Afghanistan borders China, Iran, Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics (now states) Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan has only had set borders in the last century, much of current Pakistan used to be part of what was considered Afghanistan until lost to the British, who incorporated into their Indian colony.
Right now Afghanistan is about the size of Texas, with mountains that reach as high as 25,000, as well as vast plans. It’s landlocked (since losing Baluchistan to the British), and many areas are short of water. It potentially has large oil and gas reserves, but at this point its main export is opium – it provides over 90% of the world’s heroin.
Afghanistan, with 30 million people, is not defined by a single language, tribe, or ethnic group, but is a mosaic of different identities. It has been that way for a long time, but currently here is the official breakdown:
There are two official languages: Farsi (spoken by about half the population as a native tongue) and Pashto, spoken by 35%. Turkic languages (Uzbek and Turkmen, primarily) are spoken by about 8% of the population, and the rest speak various ethnic languages. About 90% of the population learns to speak Farsi. Literacy is only 36%, with 51% male and 21% female literacy.
Ethnicity:
42% Pashtun
27% Tajik
9% Hazara
9% Uzbek
4% Aimak
3% Turkmen
2% Baloch
4% other
Note: this creates natural conflicts. The Pashtuns are the largest population, and in fact the name “Afghan” originally was how the Pashtuns were designated. While now all citizens are considered “Afghans,” (decided at a 1965 Loya Jirga) there is a sense that some Pashtuns believe the country is theirs. The country is 99% Muslim, but there is an 80-20 split between Shi’ia and Sunni Muslims. This is important, especially now as tensions have been rising between the two sects of Islam in recent years. Historically Sunnis generally had the upper hand, and Shi’ite groups were suppressed; some like the Hazara received considerable persecution in large part because they were Shi’ite.
II. History
Afghanistan has a long, rich history. Archeologists believe it was one of the earliest places where plants and animals were domesticated, and cities were forming well before 2000 BCE. Kabul, now the capital, probably formed sometime between 1500 – 2000 BCE, with the region the center of the Aryan tribes. Both Afghanistan and Iran claim to be the home of Zarathustra or Zoroaster, which was one of the first monotheistic religions; Zoroastrianism had an impact on Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Zoroaster died in 522 BCE.
The region was conquered by Alexander the Great 329-323 BCE. This starts a tradition of Afghanistan (at that time the tribes of the region) being uncommonly resistant to conquest and control. Alexander never truly subjugated the people.
For a while there was a strong Buddhist influence in Afghanistan, peaking in the first century. The Taliban made headlines in destruction of a great Buddhist monument built in the 6th century – the Buddhas of Bamyan, two large statues. By the 5th century, however, invaders wiped out most of the Buddhist influence, and in the 6th century Afghanistan was conquered by Persia. But the Afghan tribes revolted; again; Afghans resisted outside control.
In 652 Islam was introduced to the region. During the Ghaznavid Dynasty around the the turn of the first millennium Afghanistan was at the center of Islamic power. Ghazni’s death in 1030 leads to collapse of that empire, and by 1219 Genghis Khan invaded Afghanistan and destroyed much of their agricultural infrastructure.
Perhaps the most successful period of rule over the Afghan people was the Moghul Empire, begun when in 1504 Babur, from India, conquered Kabul. Competing for control of the region were the Persians in the West, and the Uzbeks in the North, as well as the Pashtuns and other trives. There were constant movements against Moghul rule. 1708 Mir Wais wins independence for Kandahar, and his son Mir Mahmud would later defeat the Persian empire, though they couldn’t hold on to Persia, and by from 1736 to 1738 Persian king Nadir Shah takes large chunks of what is now Afghanistan, including Kandahar.
In 1747 modern Afghanistan is founded when Nadir Shah was assassinated, and a meeting of the clans at the first Loya Jirga, near Kandahar, in October proclaimed Ahmad Shah Abdali as leader (also known as Durrani). He would use war to expand Afghanistan’s borders. Yet this early success was short lived. His successors couldn’t hold the empire, and by the early 19th century held only areas near Kabul, losing even Pashtun regions considered the core of the Durrani empire (which included much of what is now known as Pakistan). But this also showed the problem for Afghanistan: Pashtun, but there were many clans, and strong Persian and Uzbek influences remaining. Not a clear set nation; chaos was constant in the early 19th century.
In 1826 Dost Mohammad Khan gains control of Kabul and works to try to reunite Afghanistan. But by this time it was the European age of Colonialism, and a rival tribal leader, Shah Shuja, worked with the British to invade Afghanistan. The British end Dost Mohammad Khan’s efforts to reunite Afghanistan, deport Dost Mohammad Khan, and instead put Shah Shuja in control as a kind of puppet leader in 1839. He’s killed by Afghans in 1842.
And then the Afghans rise up, and defeat the British, who in 1842 lost 28,000 people who were ambushed after being promised safe passage (a military force of 16,500 and 12,000 dependents). Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammad Khan lead the uprising and became an Afghan hero. Dost Mohammad Khan returns to rule as the British have been driven out.
In 1863 Dost Mohammad Khan died, and his son Sher Ali claimed the throne, but did not establish rule due to internal fighting and rivals until 1868.
In 1878 the British invade again, and this time the Afghans lose considerable territory permanently (now Pakistan), with borders fixed in 1893. The current borders are closer to set as Russia near this time also defines a border and promises to respect Afghan sovereignty.
In 1921 the British tried again to defeat Afghanistan in the third Anglo-Afghan war, and again are defeated as Afghans gain full control of their territory and foreign policy. King Amanullah takes power, and had visions of westernizing the country. His wife, Queen Soraya, even dared to appear without a veil in public, and this accentuated opposition to his western reforms. In 1929 he is removed, and after turmoil King Nadir Khan takes over. He is assassinated in 1933 and King Zahir Shah takes over and rules until 1973.
Although the King tried to institute western reforms, increasing instability and a growing Communist movement led to a coup d’etat in 1973 by Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan. He’s overthrown in 1978 in a Communist coup led by Hafizullah Amin, and then things start to unravel quickly. Amin wants to institute radical reforms, and when asked to slow down by the Soviets, he cites Stalin’s comment about not being able to make an omlette without breaking a few eggs. He is ruthlessly anti-Islam and ignites a revolt in the countryside. Amin begs the Soviets for help; they decline and instead decide to try to assassinate him and install Muhammad Taraki. But Amin hears about this, kills Taraki, and defies the Soviets. The Soviets then decide they have to take care of this themselves, invade, remove Amin and install Barbak Karmel. He would rule until 1986, when the Soviets, trying to find a way out of Afghanistan, put in Najibullah who they hoped would be more acceptable to Muslims. (He was hung after the Soviets left).
The map shows that Central Asia now consists of a number of states. Afghanistan borders Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran. Important nearby states include Kyrgystan and Kazahkstan. Not normally considered central Asian states, but ones whose politics interwine with the region are Russia and India. Of the states listed above, all except Pakistan, China, and Iran are former Soviet Republics; Afghanistan bordered the Soviet Union. India is to the south of Pakistan and they have fought wars over the Kashmir region, and another war could be iminent. India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons.
The Mujahedeen – soldiers of God – arose to challenge. With massive amounts of American aid and weapons, the Islamist “freedom fighters” stymied Soviet efforts and the Soviets were bogged down. There was blowback, however. Most of the money to fund the war was funneled through Pakistan. Unfortunately for the US, Pakistan wanted to have a pliable government in power in Afghanistan, and funneled the weapons and money to the most extremist Islamist groups, including people like Osama Bin Laden. Moderates or non-religious groups got virtually nothing.
After the war, the Arabs that fought the Soviets hung around, and soon expanded their jihad to a general protection of Islam from the outside, with the west going from benefactor to foe, especially after 1991. When Mohammad Omar’s Taliban overthrew the corrupt and unstable "northern alliance," it brought some stability, but also a reign of religious terror to Afghanistan, including near war with Iran (the Taliban is Sunni Muslim, the Iranians are Shi’ite).
The Taliban: the regime everyone loved to hate
For its five years in power, the Taliban angered the world. They were incredibly sexist. For example, women couldn’t show any of their body. If they did, they would be severely beaten by religious police. Women couldn’t have men as doctors. Women couldn’t become doctors. Where does that leave women with health care problems? They destroyed Buddhist statues that had stood since the 5th century, and people were beaten or killed for listening to music, or doing anything seen as unholy. There were intense condemnations world wide.
But despite condemnations, nobody wanted to actually overthrow them. The US increased aid to resistance fighters, but that was mostly due to the Clinton Administration’s obsession with Osama Bin Laden, something the early Bush administration would dismiss as giving Bin Laden too much attention and credit. Bin Laden had declared war on the West after the Gulf War started in Iraq, and had a cadre of loyal fighters from the fight against the Soviets. He was based in Sudan until 1996 when, under pressure from the US, Sudan kicked him out. He went to Afghanistan, set up bases to train his network of terrorists, and prepared for a war designed to destroy the western economy. The US followed this with concern, especially after successful terror attacks in Africa in 1998. Bin Laden was on the CIA hit list, and once they nearly succeeded. By the late nineties, unbeknownst to the public, the US was at virtual war with al qaeda.
When President Bush took office in 2001, he rejected the view from some of the departing Clinton team that al qaeda was the major problem facing the US. Bush was focused on China, the ABM Treaty with Russia, and finding an alternative to the Kyoto accords. Then, on September 11, 2001, Bin Laden’s al qaeda network hit the US with a massive terror attack, and shifted American priorities. The result was a coalition put together to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban.
After 9-11, the US realized that if it were to go to war against al qaeda – or against the Taliban for refusing to turn over al qaeda leadership – it would need bases in the region. It looked to Pakistan first, and Pakistan – suffering under economic sanctions imposed after its test of a nuclear weapon a couple years earlier – signed on. That was a gamble by General Musharraf. Many in Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, who they saw as almost a surrogate for Pakistani dominance of Afghan politics.
Now Musharraf had a dilemma. He could continue support of the Taliban, and risk the ire of the United States, an ire he could not afford given the continuing tensions with India. Also, that kind of stand off would embolden Muslim extremists. Musharraf also had a vision for a more modern Pakistan, and saw Islamic extremism as a nuisance he could eliminate. Now, however, he could use the war to enhance his power. This meant confronting many in the high levels of the intelligence service and military, and risking public dissent. The Muslim extremists were a minority, but a powerful and vocal one.
It was a gamble, but it appeared to pay off at first. Sanctions were removed, Musharraf gained more authority and kept extremists at bay, and got some support from the US for helping Pakistan deal with India. He also got military aid, intelligence, and a promise that the new Afghanistan would not be anti-Pakistan.
Arguably, he had no choice. But it’s still not certain how Pakistan is handling this. The war was supposed to be fast, with Pakistan giving only indirect support. But it’s been seven years, and the Taliban still controls a good chunk of the country (after for awhile having been driven from power everywhere), and elsewhere local elites are in power. Al qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan as a refuge in this war. Much of the area on the Afghan-Pakistan border is Pashtun territory, the border was a colonial creation, not reflecting real ethnic differences. Therefore the border itself has been traditionally non-existent, left to the Pashtun tribes to move as they please. This is also the area of Bin Laden and the Taliban’s strength, and most likely they are still using that region to move around, even as a way out of that region. It’s not clear how many in the Intelligence service are secretly helping al qaeda. Musharraf has removed a lot of people and imprisoned radical Muslim clerics, but most were later released, and still operate schools that focus on radicalizing and inciting young Muslims to join the extremists.
Schools and poverty: The schools also teach how to read and write, and are provided for the poor who otherwise would have no chance for an education. This makes them popular, but they recruit terrorists as well as educate. They are where people like Johnny Walker became ‘brainwashed’ – drawn into the religious extremism like a cult. Pakistan hasn’t shut these down (to do so would create a back lash) and many clerics who were arrested have quietly been released. There is a lot of active help being given to former Taliban and al qaeda, and not a lot the US can do about it. Beyond that, al qaeda still has a lot of money, and even troops loyal to the government can be bribed – that’s the tradition in that part of the world.
Terrorism - American Foreign Policy
One time I taught AFP I used a book by Paul Pillar, “Terrorism and US Foreign Policy,” to spend time focusing directly on the war on terror and terrorism. That didn’t have enough information on policy processes and institutions, so I replaced it, but it raised some issues. Given that Pillar’s book is written before (and appeared before) the September 11th terrorist attacks, it was evident that all of the stuff that has come out about threats and capacities of terrorists since then is not new. It was also clear that at least in the last three years of the Clinton Administration counter terrorism was becoming a top priority of American policy makers, and numerous plots and attempts had been stymied.
In other words, the world did not change in terms of terrorist threats after 9-11 – indeed, only public knowledge of these threats and possibilities grew. Before September 2001 targets tended to be overseas, and terrorism here either failed (the attempt to blow up the WTC in 1993) or was domestic in origin (Timothy McVeigh). But the threats were real then, and nothing that has happened since has altered the basic facts he points out – except perhaps Pillar’s (at that time apparently accurate) belief that airport security had improved to make skyjackings improbable. His claim there is also telling – the terrorist hit somewhere where even the experts thought we already were doing a good job.
What is terrorism? How do you distinguish between legitimate violence and terrorism? The distinction seems to be important. In the Israel-Palestinian conflict the Israelis claim that their acts against Palestinians are not terrorist, while the acts taken against Israelis are. Why? How do you make the distinction? (After all, terrorists kill fewer civilians than the ‘collateral damage’ of most armed forces)
A few points I’d make:
a) terrorism is a strategy, it isn’t an ideology or a movement.
b) usually terrorism is not considered state actions, but rather the actions undertaken by actors without a state, either to overthrow a government or achieve some aim (independence for Northern Ireland or Palestine, freeing Kashmir, creating a new Basqueland, driving the west out of Saudi Arabia and overthrowing the royal family). One even could put the American revolutionaries in that category, including the Boston Tea party.
c) terrorism now is defined by a desire to terrorize. This often means focusing on civilians as potential targets – though the IRA routinely gives warnings so civilians can be evacuated, and some groups aim at economic infrastructure rather than lives.
d) terrorism is a strategy that seems to be a ‘last resort’ strategy, by a group that lacks the ability to achieve its goals by any other means. It can be effective – even Manachem Begin of Israel (PM in the late seventies) was a terrorist early on, working to create an Israeli state, and the PLO has made gains through its acts. It has in the past been part of state strategies, such as Soviet support of left wing terrorist organizations.
e) terrorism of some kinds may be legitimate. If, say, Maine was taken over by a dictatorial power, and we engaged in some kind of sabotage to try to free Maine, it might be justified.
f) there are different kinds of terrorism with different methods, motives, and strategies. There is a difference between the Boston Tea Party and flying planes into the World Trade Center. At times terrorism wants to inflame other conflicts, spark some escalation of violence, prevent cooperation (PLO attacks last time Zinni was in the mideast, for example, or Jewish settlements), or destabilize governments.
g) It is possible that ‘fighting’ terrorists in some cases might legitimize them in the eyes of others and help them achieve their goals, making the nature of the reaction a very tricky issue.
All this complicates the issue of what a ‘fight against terrorism’ means. At the very least, it appears that the current ‘war’ is not a war against all terrorism of all kinds, but specific terrorism that threatens civilian populations with deadly attacks for a cause that is considered illegitimate.
Roots of terrorism
One thing not often discussed is the question of why does terrorism exist? Clearly there has to be some kind of causal factor (a goal, a belief), but why does this get turned into violence. Simply chalking it up to ‘crazy people’ or ‘evildoers’ is not enough – while we can condemn evil doers morally, to analyze why they do what they do we have to understand the root causes and motivations.
Anger: Most terrorists are angry about something – a perceived injustice, lack of a state, foreign intervention, ideological dissent. You don’t kill yourself with a suicide bomb or drive a 767 into a building just due to political preferences. This requires a deep level of commitment and a belief that nothing else will work.
Living standards, economic prospects: While the ringleaders of many terrorist organizations come from well off families (like Bin Laden), their support – recruiting, being able to hide, find allies to assist, etc., often is related to poverty and prospects of the future. A Palestinian who believes Israel will simply keep choking their lands is more likely to resort to suicide bombing than one who believes there is a chance for a better future.
The roots can be seen not as completely causal, there will always be incorrigibles. Consider, however, the US in the late sixties. Radical movements arose, some violent, often angry at the US system, capitalism, etc. Many students like you at that time joined such movements out of anger with Vietnam, civil rights, and a belief the government was corrupt. Take away the war, undertake reforms that create more trust in government, and the protests die out. The ‘incorrigibles’ remain, but are less effective and marginalized. That doesn’t mean protests in the sixties were terrorism – most weren’t, they were a democratic way to try to stop the government from undertaking disasterous policies – but the example shows how conditions create a greater likelihood of political action, even violent political action.
Part of a policy: Must be to consider the roots, try to eliminate the causes of terrorism rather than just attack the symptoms. Of course, we aren’t able to end the poverty and injustice world wide, at least not given current resources. So its not a complete answer.
There has been a lot of under publicized success against terrorist organizations, attacking their ability to coordinate attacks or get materials. The list of thwarted attacks is long, the list of terrorist successes very short. Yet, of course, there are limits – and all they need is one big success to push aside all the failures. That’s an aspect of terrorism made clear in 2001: one success has a huge impact, and given the nature of terrorism, it’s unlikely that there won’t be another success, even if it follows a string of failures.
The 9-11 Report and its aftermath: Although the 9-11 report had a variety of recommendations, and pointed to a number of intelligence failures (especially lack of coordination, competition between agencies – understandable in the context of the theory of bureaucratic politics we discussed last time – and extreme uncertainty). They recommended changes, and currently a variety of checks are in place.
1. We are in a period of systemic change, as the bipolar world of the Cold War is becoming something else. This isn’t just a change in state power, but a process often glibly called ‘globalization’ whereby borders are more porous, international trade more intense, cultures more likely to interact, and communication and connections easier to maintain.
2. Systemic change is often violent, and often requires a rethinking of state goals and policies, as well as the means to implement them. This is evident in the debate between the unilateralists (the US can go it alone if need be) and multilateralists (the world requires cooperation to deal with the kind of problems entailed by globalization, including terrorism).
3. The nature of warfare and international violence is changing. State to state violence is more likely among lesser developed states than advanced industrialized states, and the use of weapons of mass destruction by a country like Iraq against the US would be suicidal. But terrorism opens a different set of possibilities in conflicts, and dramatically increases the vulnerability of the United States.
4. Cultural misunderstandings and clashes are likely (Huntington’s argument), though as the author points out, most of Islam does not agree with the Bin Laden approach or beliefs, and this doesn’t really represent a culture clash. Arguably, Bin Laden could be trying to get the US to respond in a way that turns it to a clash of cultures, something the US has to be afraid of.
5. We don’t yet know how the new system will look, or how best to deal with these new threats. These are issues full of uncertainty and potential danger, and need to be understood and discussed.