American Foreign Policy

Final class

We’ve contrasted the various American schools of thought in foreign policy.  Today Fukuyama, in thinking of international institutions, touches on issues that divide the US and much of the rest of the world.  So I want to take that in a bit of a different direction.  Two discussion questions or challenges to Fukuyama’s perspective. 

Challenge one: Europe is from Venus, America from Mars (Kagan)

One kind of foreign policy he touches on today, though he rejects it, is what some have called a post-sovereign foreign policy.  This has been embraced by many EU countries to some extent, and in many ways defines the differences between the US and the EU, and raises challenges involving the future of states like Russia and China.

What is a post-sovereign policy?

1.  Rejection of sovereignty and independence as the cornerstone of foreign policy.  This is perhaps the exact opposite of the neo-conservative view of ‘national greatness.’  Rather, a belief that: a) globalization means that interdependencies dominate, and that the interests of states intersect; b) corporations tend less and less to be national economic actors and instead transnational, requiring international institutions to govern; c) problems are not usually ones that can be dealt with through sovereign actions, but requires international cooperation, again best facilitated through and legitimized by international institutions; d) military power is seen as becoming obsolete, as economic interactions overcome military ones, which are increasingly costly and unlikely to achieve positive results; and e) business deals and interactions are a better way to moderate rogue state behavior than sanctions and especially military action.

2.  Results of these assumptions: a) willingness to sacrifice direct national interest for international institutions.  Note:  national interests continue to exist, but they are worked out in the kind of negotiation and compromise that one uses in domestic political contexts between differing interests and goals – not diplomacy, but bureaucratic processes and agreements.  b) rejection of American efforts to isolate states like Cuba, Iran, and others.  The US sees this as extremely selfish of the Europeans – unwilling to give up Iranian oil and profits to achieve the ‘greater good’ of pushing for change in Iran.  For the Europeans, they think their approach is not only more effective, but connects Iran more to the health and interdependencies of the international system.

Thus: Iraq a major difference.  The US couldn’t believe that the EU and NATO weren’t lining up behind the Bush Administration plan.  Even if they didn’t agree, they could at least support the US in the UN.  The response was surprise, anger (hence ‘old Europe vs. new Europe,’) and a rift in the alliance that became dangerous to the US when Iraq went bad.  By 2005 the Bush administration shifted away from the ‘cowboy diplomacy’ which characterized the first administration, and quietly the US and the Europeans worked to patch up differences.  Still, there are fundamental disagreements about foreign policy.

The future?

These disagreements may pull the US and the EU apart in the future, especially concerning states like Iran.  On the other hand, there are signs that the US might be questioning how to do foreign policy in this ‘new world.’  For instance, likely Democratic Presidential nominee Barack Obama seems to be very close to a European approach, unlike his rival Hillary Clinton (he wants to talk with the Iranians, Clinton is content to threaten them with ‘obliteration.’)   Former Vice President Gore talks a very European form of environmentalism, and there are currents in the US political system, currently minority currents, which reflect the kind of post-sovereign ideas dominant even amongst conservatives in Europe.

Discussion question One:  Neo-conservatives, and even Fukuyama, believe that the Europeans are missing an important point: the fact there is a real battle between the forces of extremism or authoritarianism on the one hand, and the forces of democracy and liberalism on the other.  They dismiss the Europeans as ‘post-modern,’ not recognizing the moral dimensions of the differences in global politics, and thus too focused on either economic interests or ignoring the actions of evil leaders.  Fukuyama would admit that the neo-conservatives overestimated the power of national sovereignty and underestimate the importance of institutions.  He says Europeans overestimate institutions.  For Fukuyama and the neo-conservatives, the huge debate is about how to promote democracy and try to counter authoritarians.

For Europeans, this is too ideological a view of foreign policy, one that is pre-disposed towards ignoring difficulties of social and political change.  It’s better to be pragmatic, work for interests, and rely on time and good will.

Challenge two:  Neo-liberal vs. neo-Marxist

Although the Cold War is over, the left-right ideological conflict still exists.  In some ways the left has a stronger argument here – the left is always stronger when it is criticizing economic conditions, and weakest when it tries to come up with solutions, especially those involving government power.

Neo-conservatives have a generally neo-liberal view of economics in terms of a belief in markets, and a connection between markets and democracy.   They disagree in terms of the role of the state, neo-liberals are more supportive of institutions, and Fukuyama is somewhere between the two.  It is a view that does have an ideological framework and core.  Neo-Marxian views on the third world argue that:

a) neo-liberal globalization is in essence the rich getting richer and the poor getting power, both between countries and within countries.  This is due to the way developing countries are forced to open up to markets and outside investment.  Just as this allows big western corporations to exploit third world states for cheap labor, often destroying the traditional structure of society by moving sustenance crops to cash crops and building sweat shops, it also moves good paying first world jobs to the third world.  Thus the working class in the first world sacrifices pay, welfare programs (so it can compete for jobs), and union strength.

b) this is a system prone to crisis, and likely to collapse.  It is built on expanding credit in a way that is not regulated.  States could regulate credit markets, but when it becomes international, and global capital is unleashed, then players can work the system and ultimately it will create bubbles that will collapse and lead to depression.   Moreover, we look at famines and poverty in the third world, and it’s not clear that the economic system we have isn’t benefiting a few of us very much, and structuring under development.

If so, then our foreign policy can be criticized as one bent on western wealth and dominance.  The Communists may have been dead wrong about the solution – a big government trying to control and plan everything, but may have been right about the dangers of capitalism.

Is this a legitimate argument?  How does one respond to it; if it were true, what would that mean for our foreign policy discussions?