Iran

IRAN: A theocratic democracy?

Iran is unique.  It is nominally democratic, but also its a theocracy.  It has oil and wealth, but poverty and instability.  It has been at war, it is in transition...but from a compartive politics perspective it leads to a couple of very particular questions:

1) Is Iran’s version of “Islamic democracy” potentially viable?  After all, religion is a different kind of ideology.  We have liberal democracy, social democracy, what about Islamic democracy? Compared to other parts of the third world, its doing rather well in terms of allowing political action and individual freedom.

2) Can Islamic democracy or a theocracy modernize and liberalize while keeping a balance, or will one be sacrificed for the other?  (Note: it took a long time for Christianity to give up its political clout, even as the West modernized).

3) Can Iran become a major world actor in a positive sense (trade, cooperation) even while maintaining its unique and often frightening to the outside style of government?

Iran stats:   Note a population of about 75 million, easily the “superpower” of the region (Iraq has only 22 million by comparison).  Population growth is rather high at 2%, but this isn’t a major problem.  The population is more urban (60%), with an ethnic mix between Persian 51%, Azerbaijani 24%, Kurd 7%, and Arab 3%.  Religion links most of them: 89% are Sh’ia Muslim, 10% Sunni Muslim, 1% other (Zorasterian, Christian, etc.)  Kurds are Sunni.

GNP is decent, per capita $1780, with purchasing power $5530.  Though not clear in the stats, there remains a vast discrepency between the wealthy and poor, a difference which is one reason why the Islamic revolt took place in the first place.  Literacy rates are decent (77.7% for men, 59.3% for women), Farsi is the most common language (58%), followed by Turkish or Turkish dialects, 26%.  Kurdish is 9%.

Notes from history:

Modern Iran: I’d note only that modern Iran traces itself back to 1921, when a military coup by Col. Reza Khan began Pahlavi dynasty.  He crowned himself Shah, and ruled with an iron fist until 1941, when Britain and the Soviet Union attacked to assure Germany didn’t control oil.  (Note: this also had Cold War implications, there was fear that the Soviets would expand control over Iran).  After WWII a democracy took hold, though tenuous.  Muhammad Mossadegh won election in 1953.  Mossadegh was seen as too friendly to the Soviets and too willing to nationalize Iranian oil.  In reality, it was the oil nationalization that scared people.  Britain and the US refused to purchase Iranian oil, and soon Iran’s economy was tottering.  It was only then that Mossadegh formed an alliance with the Communist Tudeh, and the US used that as excuse to remove him thorugh a CIA sponsored military coup which put the first Shah’s son Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in place as the Shah of Iran.

Iran under the Shah: Development of a modern, yet authoritarian state.  A police state that tried to appear a westernized state.

Irony and tragedy of Iran.  Though the Shah modernized it, its position on the border of the USSR also got the US to promise considerable aid, and to pressure the Iranians to make sure their potential communist rebels remained impotent.  That meant the development of an extensive secret police (SAVAK), with no real liberal political rights.

For the US, Iran was part of the twin pillar strategy -- designed to assure US interests in the mideast by focusing on Iran as the military power (80 million people rugged terrain; no one comes close), and Saudi Arabia as the economic oil supplier.  As long as these two countries were friendly to the US the region and the oil supply was secure.  Big threat: Soviets.  They border the region, and could potentially try to close the Persian Gulf, thereby cutting oil supplies to the West and causing a massive recession or depression, which could lead to the collapse of the entire western political and economic system.  Iran had to be strong to keep the Soviets out.  That was the main threat.

Given that, it is perhaps understandable, if not moral, how the US continued to support a military regime.  It also appeared to be westernizing, as women were emancipated, some land reform took place, ovting was allowed by women and men.  Shah also anti-religious, considering religion backwards and brainless.   However, the Shah believed in trickle down economics, and the oil revenues that made the upper crust wealthy didn’t trickle down.  Soon you had two Iran’s: the first a westernizing, urban, sophisticated Iran with a small portion of the population; the second a poor, rural and traditional Iran, which was resenting both the scope of westernization, their own poverty, and the Shah’s secret police.

By the late seventies the Shah’s grip on power was failing.  In the countryside his anti-Islam policies (he considered religion something for the weak mindned) were leading to the growth of Islamic revival movements, and hatred of SAVAK spread to intellectuals, liberals, and a variety of opposition groups.  The Shah tried to reform, but protests spread and, in a move that shocked the US he fell from power.  This really throw US foreign policy into turmoil – our biggest military ally in the region was now a potential foe – and of course Iran fell into chaos as well.

Since then: turmoil.  Khomeini, bitter from exile and rigid in his beliefs, was one of many leader of the Iranian revolution in 1979.  Liberals, Marxists, and other Islamic groups were also involved, but two things helped the Islamic fundamentalists consolidate power in Iran:

 a) taking US hostages, whipping up resentment at US support for the Shah and alleged “colonial” tactics; and

 b) being victims of an attack from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which united the country in defense in a ten year war which saw Iran attacked with chemical weapons.  Note: the US came to aid Iraq at this time, further hurting relations with Iran, which started to support terrorist organizations like Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The eighties were a cold, dark time for Western-Iranian relations, despite efforts by the Reagan administration to reach out and deal by trading arms for hostages (leading to a scandal that severely weakened Reagan at the end of his Presidency – the Iran Contra affair)..

The Islamic Republic of Iran.

Theocratic state: Shiite branch of Islam as the official religion, all legislation must be scrutinized for Islamic content.  Elections to the Majles every four years, originally 270 members, now 290. 

Belief: the ethics of Islam and its spiritual teachings provide the basis for the social and political foundation of the state.  The press is free in all matters, as are the people, UNLESS they violate the moral dictates or go against the religion.

Governmental structure:

All citizens 15 years old and up can vote.   Universal suffrage.

Executive branch: Headed by the President, currently a conservative named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.   He was the first true conservative elected to the post, Iran since the revolution has had voters preferring moderates, hoping for changes in the fundamental regime.  The last President  Khatami was elected in 1997 and re-elected in 2001.  He had promised reforms, but only delivered modest results.  In 2000 and 2001 both the Clinton and Bush administration considered close ties with Khatami, but ultimately the Bush Administration decided instead to seek regime change as part of the strategy of going after Iraq.  Currently relations are poor. 

The President chooses the cabinet (executive branch), but these must be approved by parliament (Majles).  The President still has considerable authority.  The budget comes from the President’s office (to the majles), the President signs treaties, chairs the National Security Council (dealing with defense and foreign policy), and can propose legislation.  So far, the clergy has dominated the Presidency.  The President must be a devout Shi’ite, and approved by the Guardian Council.  Ultimately, though, Presidential power yields to the power of the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader.

Guardian Council: Despite legal powers to the President and the Majles, real power lies with the religious clerics who control the guardian council.  The Supreme Leader, a religious head, also has considerable power: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  This is why Iran is a theocracy: the religious authorities are above the political actors.  Some friendly to Iran would compare this to the US Supreme Court.  Just as our judicial branch makes sure the Constitution isn’t violated, the Iranian Guardian Council makes sure the religious foundation of their democratic system isn’t violated.  They are the ones who empower judges to step in and censor the press and punish people for violating Islamic law.  (The clergy also dominates the bureaucracy, espcially the Culture and Islamic Guidance bureaucracy, which has taken SAVOK’s place as the Iranian “secret police.”)

Note: the Guardian Council is not completely dictatorial, and thus the dilemma.  They can reject names on the ballots for the Presidency or Majles (and rejected over 5000 for the last elections), but haven’t tried to completely stifle liberal reformism.  In fact, they’ve allowed it, at least to a point.  The reason: they recognize that the public is strongly in favor of liberalization and reform, and if they simply tried to clamp down, it would create dissent and disruption, something they prefer to avoid.  Hence they try to exercise power behind the scene, clamping down to show they can if they feel challenged, but hoping that people like Khatami realized there are limits.  Their job has been easier since the US invaded Iraq, it has allowed the hardliners to rationalize taking a tough stand, and anti-Americanism has increased, allowing conservatives to try to paint reformers as being too friendly to American or western ideas.  The US invasion of Iraq has hurt the reform efforts in Iran.  Not only did Ahmadinejad win the Presidency in 2005, but the conservatives won the Majles in 2004, again in the aftermath of the “axis of evil” comments and Iraq war.  Iranian nationalism trumped the desire for reform.

Also - splits in the clergy.  The clergy is also not unified.  Many of the more pre-eminent clergymen don’t want to dirty their hands with politics, its often middle level clerics who are leading. 

The Ayatollah Khomeini’s belief in theocracy is countered by many, like Iraqi Ayatollah Sistani, who believe that while the state should be Islamic, the clergy should focus on religious issues and not political ones.  The result is that Iraq’s government, should it stabilize, is likely to be a Shi’ite Islamic government, but with a different perspective on the role of the clergy.  Many hope that this will be a positive influence on Iran – though at this point Iraq’s government is weak, and Iran exercises considerable influence.

The clergy is also split between the “Soceity of the militant clergy” and the “Association of the militant clergy.”  The Society is more statist/leftist, seeing the role of Islam as providing a social welfare state focused on individual equality and human needs.  The Association is more free market, looking to continue policies somewhat like that of the old Shah for economic development and modernization -- albeit with Islamic controls.   Each side wants some liberalization, and hence they allow it, but are careful.  It has worked.  Although Khatami’s election and the Majles elections in 2000 created great expectations that Iran was going to “wake up” and join the world of democratic states, not a lot happened, and now with the conservatives in power, it’s hard to imagine real change.  In 2006, however, local and council elections were a rebuff to the conservatives, suggesting that reformers are on the upswing.  These elections were important because they determine who will choose the next Supreme Leader, and now it’s almost certain not to be an extreme fundamentalist.  Ahmadinejad has been  criticized for being too confrontational with the West, making it harder for Iran to develop economically.    

Majles: unicameral, 290 members, passes laws (but again, they must be approved by the Guardian council.

Military: the military has been a concern for many religious hard liners.  They’ve tried to maintain control through placing Islamic chaplins in military units as spies and more importantly creating the Pasdaran, a special revolutionary guard loyal to the Islamic leadership, and creating an alternative, often more elite military group (similar to Iraq and Saddam’s Republican Guards).

The Role of Oil

Oil helped the Shah build a modern Iran; his hope was to create other sources of income so Iran would not be completely oil dependent.  It didn’t really work.  In some ways, that’s the same goal of the current regime.  Soon after Khomeini came to power oil prices plummetted, and that hurt the fledging regime, which was at war and ostracized.  Now with oil prices high, Iran is being courted, and sees a chance to again try to promote diversification of the economy.  Unlike the Shah, they are engaging in more income redistribution and an attempt to spread the wealth.  Not only does this fit with Islamic teaching, but also will help prevent another revolt, since the revolt against the Shah wasn’t really out of Muslim fervor, but more out of economic discontent (plus a backlash against westernization).  Can it work?

The hope of some: society in Iran is very modern, science and computer skills advanced, and the westernization brought in by the Shah took for a lot of people.  Many tire of the rigid ways of the Islamic fundamentalists, and drugs and alcohol are increasingly used.  (I list that as a good thing, since it shows western influence, but of course to the extent it is addiction and anti-social, it is a bad thing, and a sign of what western decadence brings...)  Will society open up again, though perhaps with a more Iranian/Moslem focus?

Problems:

Strong fundamentalist voice has gained strength.  They see the US as the enemy, and in his speech before the UN after taking office Khatami stressed that an Islamic state needed a voice on the Security Council (a community of 1 billion believers), and that the US unipolar “fantasy” should be pushed aside.   Many were dismayed by Khatami’s rhetoric, but compared to Ahmadinejad’s claims that Israel has no right to exist (though he didn’t threaten Israel as some claim) and other boisterous statements, Khatami was mild.  The fundamentalists want more; they believe that the goal of Iran should be to unite the Islamic world as much as possible under a more religious regime, meaning spreading eventually into Iraq (especially Shiites there) and beyond.

Nuclear showdown? Iran and the West are in a showdown over Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear energy.  That is actually rational – they should get alternative energy sources to oil to be a modern economy, they need to sell as much of their oil as possible and have a diverse energy system.  But the claim is that they want nuclear weapons.  While it is almost impossible they’d do anything rash with them like attack Israel, it would make them a regional power.  Given their strategic position on the Persian gulf, a non-Arab link between the Arab Mid-east, and states like Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Russia and the central Asian republics, the US would prefer Iran not become a nuclear power.  But it’s being played out in conditions of uncertainty and threats.

Iraq:  Iran has benefited greatly from US problems in Iraq, and the Iraqi government is made up largely of groups who had lived in exile in Iran while Saddam was in power.  Iran has also helped form Shi’ite militias in Iraq who now are remaining quiet (the US is focusing on the Sunnis and al qaeda, which is also Sunni), but it’s clear Iran expects to have a major impact in Iraq after the US leaves.

Economics and reform:  With economic problems real, reformists hope to regain some momentum.  They urge the US to refrain from trying to influence Iranian politics much, and we’ll see what happens.

What does Iran’s experience tell us about theocratic or Islamic democracy?

Is it feasible for such a thing to survive, or will modernism and the “real world” secularize any such attempt over time?  (Note: keep in mind Iran’s special situation as a regional power and having been very secularized by the Shah).

Is it possible to have a mix of free market reforms and an Islamic state, or will Iran be forced to choose?

Remember Burke and the importance of tradition.  Clearly, the Shah’s efforts failed because he neglected tradition.