ON TO IRAQ
For most of you, we have been at war in Iraq since for a good chunk of your lives. Many of you may have been only 13 or 14 when that war started. It has defined, in part, your political perspective. 4000 American soldiers have been killed, over 100,000 Iraqis (perhaps many more), and numerous contractors and coalition soldiers. Yet despite talk of a “surge” and a bit less violence, there is no end in sight. How did this happen, has it been worth it?
Background:
In 1960 OPEC formed: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Mostly mideastern countries, recognizing that they wanted control of a scarce world resource. Yet originally modest in scope -- cartels are hard to maintain, and the old colonizers had a lot of influence. Oil really became an issue in the seventies, and the background of operation desert storm starts there.
1970's - American Twin Pillar strategy
1. Pillar One: IRAN. Iran is easily the most powerful country in the region, the natural regional power. The population is 70 million, the terrain rugged, and it contains considerable oil reserves. Bordering the old Soviet Union (now Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan), it held considerable strategic importance as one. Add to that another important factor: Iranians are Persian, not Arab. That meant that helping Iran was not a direct threat to the other US ally in the region, Israel. Iran furthermore had a secular government (the Shah), installed by a CIA sponsored coup in 1953. The US showered Iran with advanced weapons systems, American corporations became entrenched in the Iranian economy, and it was clear that the Soviets could not threaten the region militarily and no other Arab power could threaten the Persian Gulf oil. Iran’s position was perfect for providing what almost was an arm of the American military in the Gulf.
2. Pillar Two: Saudi Arabia. The Saudi’s population is smaller, only about 8 million, and they weren’t a military power. But they had the world’s largest oil reserves, and the US saw them as the economic pillar, assuring that oil prices would not be driven too high. This was trickier; the Saudis are Arab, and sales of weapons and the like always was tough due to Israeli opposition. But the US was able to cultivate a close relationship with the Saudis.
January 1979: the protests against the Shah (spoofed on SLN, students wearing sacks over their head to prevent the Shah’s police from recognizing them) suddenly reached a fever pitch. The US was in a dilemma. Many, including Kissinger, urged President Carter to give strong support for the Shah, who wanted to clamp down brutally (like China ten years later). But Carter’s human rights approach, led by Secretary of State Cy Vance (Zbigniew Brzezinski was the hawk, Vance the cover) led him to want the Shah to reform, and hold back the repression. The result: a revolt, which sent the Shah into exile, and brought into power an anti-Western Islamic extremist the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Hostage crisis. To solidify the revolt, the new regime decided to direct anger at the US for its 1953 coup and continued support of the Shah. Student protesters, supported by the government, ceased the US embassy and held diplomats hostage for over a year. This was a very emotionally draining period for the United States, as we seemed helpless to stop it. It meant that Jimmy Carter lost his bid for re-election, and the US was embarrassed by a failed rescue attempt when a desert storm (ironic pun intended) downed the rescue helicopters. But worse than the hostages for policy makers: the loss of the military pillar of US mideast policy.
The Soviets invade Afghanistan. To many this was really a threat; risking even Soviet victory in the cold war if they could grab oil supplies. The Twin pillar strategy was failing.
Babylon against Persia. Iraq, an ostensible Soviet ally, invades Iran. Here is where we get into the foundations of the later American involvement in the Gulf War. Iraq had long had border disputes with Iran, but given Iran’s strength, it could not hope to “win” any conflict. Indeed, Iraq has only 16 million people, and a flat hard to defend territory. But in 1980 Saddam Hussein, a new leader in Iraq, thought now might be the time to invade and defeat Iran. The US no longer supported the government, the revolution caused dissarray, and defeating Iran could alter the strategic balance. The attack was originally successful, but Iran managed to solidify its position, and slowly turn the tide. Iraq’s gamble failed. Reaction, however, led to a rethinking of US policy in the Gulf.
The Eighties: First, the US decided to move closer to Iraq. Though it was clear that Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iran, it did serve as a break on Islamic fundamentalism, and Iraq was the new “power,” at least, after Iran. Second, Iraq was starting to lose the war, and an Iranian victory could mean a march of Iran into Bagdhad, expanding their power and fundamentalism. The US wanted at the very least for the two to balance each other off.
The US should not have underestimated Saddam. The CIA knew he had used poison gas against the Iranians in the war, and knew how ruthless he was. The fact that the US felt it necessary to try to work with him was another example of the US overlooking human rights, and in this case it came back to haunt the Americans. Much of Saddam’s strength came from US and West European aid. The US should not have been so surprised when Saddam again turned to war.
The crisis with Kuwait brews
Kuwait and SA had loaned Iraq considerable money during the war with Iran; Iraq saw itself as defending Kuwait and SA with Iraqi blood. When the war ended, Iraq was in difficult financial straights, and Kuwait wanted the loans repaid. Soon Iraq started resenting the “money grubbing” of the Saudis and Kuwaitis. They felt they had been protecting them while they enjoyed their wealth. Iraq also resented the very existence of Kuwait. They thought, with some justification, that Kuwait should be part of Iraq – when Britain created Kuwait out of the old Empire (originally the Ottoman Empire), they did so to try to assure control of oil, and avoid a large country being able to dominate – Kuwait would be easier to make behave. They believed that the existence of Kuwait was a remnant of colonialism.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: authoritarian (non-democratic) regimes led by a wealthy conservative regime. Kuwait especially bad, as most people are not citizens, and have no political rights, both very conservative in terms of women’s rights. Kuwait was also disliked by many Arabs, as the Kuwaitis mistreated Arab guest workers, even though they were Arab. Their law defined Kuwait citizens as only those who could trace their family back to 1922 in Kuwait, and that was minority. Given the vast oil wealth, that minority lived very well, and tended to get cushy high paying government jobs. The menial jobs went to Arab guest workers, who were not paid as well, and often not treated well. After the war, Kuwait refused to negotiate with Iraq about disputed oil fields, increased production (driving down prices) and demanded repayment of loans. Iraq protested. Remember Simpson’s episode with the sideways drilling? That was Kuwait into Iraq as well. That and over production created real disagreement.
Iraq’s reaction: amass troops near the border to Kuwait, in order to intimidate them to give in on key demands. Its unlikely Iraq planned an attack from the outset (though with Saddam one can never be certain), but the Iraqis figured that Kuwait could not really flip their finger to Iraq. Given the dislike of Kuwait by many Arabs (the Palestinians were especially mistreated) Saddam may have figured that the US would want a stronger Iraq to counter Iran anyway. However, Arabs also feared and disliked Saddam, especially the Syrians. The Iraqis were over estimating their power and the strength of their position.
Note here ideas of group think and miscommunication: It seems pretty obvious that both Iraq and the US had different concepts of what their relationship was all about, and Iraq may have been involved in groupthink, assuming US support or at least acquiescence for their acts.
Meeting with April Glaspie
US Ambassador April Glaspie was called in to talk to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. She basically told him that it was an Arab matter and the US did not plan to intervene. This was a mistake. Hussein figured that since the US had supported him during the war with Iran the US wouldn’t mind him getting rid of a corrupt, undemocratic government in Kuwait and replacing it with one friendly to Iraq. Again, he reportedly even thought Glaspie was hinting this would not be a problem by stressing the “arab-arab” nature of the conflict. Also, though the cold war was over, the Soviet Union still existed, and Iraq figured the Soviets wouldn’t want the US involved so close to their border. This seemed a no-risk strategy. Intimidate the Kuwaitis, but if need be, make them use force to give in. Glaspie, however, was simply doing as she was told, believing that it best if the Iraqis and Kuwaitis worked it out; the US didn’t think a war was likely, since it seemed inconceivable that Arabs would fight against Arabs (remember, Iran is Persian). Saddam also latched on to Babylonian history, Iraq was the cradle of civilization, the place where the Hammerabi code came from. Psychologically, he may have been prone to overestimate his power.
August 2nd: Iraqi attack into Kuwait
The U.S. was caught off guard by the sudden attack after Kuwait continued to refuse to negotiate. Probably Saddam got angry and ordered the attack on the spur of the moment, though he may have had Kuwait in his sites for sometime -- after all, Iraq never accepted having Kuwait created as a separate country.
At first, the US was unconcerned. Who cares if the sign says Exxon or Texaco, they still have to sell the oil! (That was a reaction of someone in the Bush Administration). Then Bush talked with Margaret Thatcher, who visited a couple weeks after the attack. She said that we couldn’t stand by while a country was wiped off the face of the earth. Britain’s role in history: Again, Kuwait was created to protect British oil interests; it could have -- and maybe should have -- been part of Iraq. Most countries were based on these kind of “colonial borders.” If you can call these into question, then wars could spread, she argued. Result: a US ultimatum to Iraq, which the Iraqis refused to accept. Now things got serious!
United Nations:
When Iraq took over the country of Kuwait, the United Nations acted to brand the act illegal and pass Security Council Resolution 678 which allowed the World Community to use any means necessary to free Kuwait. What it was, was the United States skillfully using the UN as a policy tool. The obvious strength for the UN was the ability of the U.N. to implement collective security, to act to uphold international law and organize a reaction which reinstated the sovereignty of Kuwait. This was a “legal” war, waged only after debate within the Security Council. The weaknesses were evident too, however. The war was really a United States action, as the U.S. used diplomatic and political clout to get its resolutions accepted by the security council. Furthermore, once passed, the resolutions gave the power over how the resolutions would be implemented to the United States, and the United Nations effectively stayed out of the picture. The result was that the Gulf War was more a United States action than a United Nations action.
Iraqi attempts: Iraq floated plans to withdraw from Kuwait and establish a new government that would be democratic, but probably friendly to Iraq. The idea: Kuwait was not a democracy, and the Kuwaiti people were abusing the Palestinians and Arab workers there, they weren’t well liked. How could the US defend an anti-democratic royal family? The US argued that this would just be a puppet government and rejected it.
Why not containment or economic sanctions?
They could have “contained” Iraq, but decided to “roll back” Iraqi influence. Why? The answer was mainly coalition politics. The economic sanctions would work, many thought, but only in years. During that time the coalition might fall apart, either out of sympathy for Iraq, or something bringing Israel into the fray. Also, Arab governments did not reflect popular opinion; popular opinion was much more pro-Iraq in countries within the coalition. If the war dragged on, or if it were some kind of containment, then that would put pressure on US allies -- either their governments might fall, or be forced to alter policy. Thus the Bush Administration decided a quick war was necessary.
January 16, 1991: The war starts on the 6:30 news.
War itself: easy military victory. An air war decimated Iraqi forces for six weeks, with the goal to psychologically break them as well as destroy the infrastructure. Most top notch Iraqi forces were moved North, so when the ground war came in February 1991, it was easy. Friendly fire was the biggest danger, and perhaps reactions to vaccines given in fear of biological war.
Lessons: High tech really mattered! US weaponry rendered Iraqi forces unable to respond (and helped by knowing their radar system from the inside thanks to East Germany’s fall). Air dominance also mattered, as well as surveillance from satellites. These advantages created an insurmountable benefit for the US. Still, there was something surreal about the war. No American dead bodies; Iraqi dead bodies were abstractions. The US was “kicking Saddam’s butt,” and “carpet bombing,” but little was said about what this meant for Iraqi soldiers. Families of American soldiers were interviewed as they worried and fretted; Iraqi families were ignored as the bombs well. Carpet bombing was 24 hours of non-stop inhumane bombing, trying to disrupt sleep and psychologically destroy the Iraqis. The reaction to that probably would make Vietnam era post-traumatic stress syndrome appear as nothing.
Winning the Peace: More difficult
Iraq gave up. The US could have “moved on to Bagdad, deposed the Hussein regime, and ended it there. BUT that would have been messy. The top troops -- the Republican Guard -- were in the North, and would have fought. Iraq basically retreated to give up Kuwait. They said, “fine, we can’t beat you, but we won’t give in without making you fight a little.” It was symbolic more than real. But if the US had moved north, that would have been bloody.
Should the US have captured Bagdad and deposed Saddam? In hindsight many say yes, but that would have been very difficult:
A) No UN approval, which would have caused problems within the NATO alliance, and likely broken up the coalition -- that could have turned victory into defeat;
B) Casualties would have mounted; public support may have waned; after all public support in the early days of Vietnam was high;
C) Iraq could have imploded, with Kurds in the North and Shi’ites in the south trying to set up their own regimes; this may have strengthened Iran, and Iran was the threat to begin with. Shi’ites are 60% of the population, and have a close relationship with Iran. They had been ruled by the 20% Sunni Arabs led by Saddam. The Kurds have always wanted their own state. Bush realized this was a pandora’s box, opening it would be very dangerous.
Anti-Saddam uprisings:
Uprisings, encouraged by President Bush, of the Shi’ites in the south and Kurds in the North were brutally put down. The US responded by instituting “no fly” zones, but that didn’t help much. The result: the US soon after winning had to deal with bad publicity of Iraq brutally attacking groups we had pledged to help. The reason was clear: fear of Iraq imploding, and an inability to do much else. Iraq had been booted out of Kuwait with force, but now what?
Hussein remained in power, so the US shifted tactics. Although the war was fought to rid Kuwait of Iraq, they expected Hussein would fall from power. Then the US could help rebuild Iraq, and even use it as an ally against Iran (who was still the regional power and more of a long term threat to the region than Saddam could have been).
Note: In many ways IRAN won the Gulf War! They came out of it the best, and are still the most powerful state in that region. The US did something Iran wished they could do to the Iraqis, and during the war Iraq even flew 300 or so high tech planes to Iran to avoid the bombs. The Iranians said, “thank you for the gift!”
But Hussein was still there. So the US added a new demand: inspectors would have to assure that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological, or nuclear. The Iraqis had to give in or continue being attacked, so they did. But once the troops were departing and the force levels down, they basically played games to prevent the inspectors from finding everything. A lot was destroyed -- much of the Iraqi war machine was eliminated in the first couple years after the war; inspectors did more to weaken Iraq than the bombs had done. But at a certain point Iraq started ignoring the inspectors.
Iraq’s point of view: we cooperated, but enough is enough! We need to sell oil, rebuild our country, and be SOVEREIGN. Obviously we couldn’t take Kuwait when we were strongest, we’re not a threat now. The US: as long as Saddam is in power, we can’t give in.
The current situation: The United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, played with the idea of simply going after Saddam – he was seen by many as the threat to the region, and we could potentially use the attacks to rally support. But no link was found between Saddam and the attacks, and the US first went to war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001.
The Taliban had gained power in 1996, remnants of Afghan freedom fighters, originally supported by the US when they fought against the USSR. They replaced a group known as the “northern alliance” who had lead Afghanistan to anarchical rule, with rape, murder, and the like common. Most welcomed the order the Taliban brought – the first since the early seventies, but soon chaffed at their rigid doctrines of religious extremism. Women had separate hospitals, couldn’t go to school, were beaten if a part of their body showed in public...western music wasn’t allowed, outside influences banished, even old Buddhist statues destroyed. It was seen as the most hated regime on the planet, so after 9-11 when the US said it had to destroy the Taliban because it supported al qaeda and Osama Bin Laden (who had taken refuge there, and essentially propped up the taliban in exchange for free movement and protection), most of the world agreed.
The war started in October 2001, and was essentially over by the end of November. International peace keepers took over the operation to keep stability, US forces remained to try to “clean up” old al qaeda and Taliban strongholds. But at this time the Taliban has regrouped, the country side is not under anyone’s control, peace keepers in Kabul are afraid to go out much as they are targets, and though the al qaeda network has been damaged, Afghanistan is arguably still without leadership, and the war has not brought needed change – it has only continued and in parts of the country increased the instability and suffering.
However, for a variety of reasons, the US continued to focus on Saddam:
1. Unfinished business. Many close to President Bush believed that they should have gotten rid of Saddam in 1991, perhaps the son wanted to finish the business of the father. Saddam had been costing the US money and prestige via the constant debates over sanctions, and the no fly zones. Some thought it should just be ended.
2. Fear that Saddam would aid terrorists. Given that Saddam had been thrashed by the US, it seems reasonable to think he’d want revenge – how better to do that than help terrorists. Even if Saddam is not a threat militarily, he still could have materials he could pass to terrorists who, not operating under traditional military tactics, could potentially deliver them. Some say this is unlikely for a variety of reasons – not the least of which being that Saddam is hated by Islamic fundamentalists who have called him an ‘infidel’ and ‘communist’ – but they do share opposition to the US. Also, Syria and Iran have ties with terrorists and have as many chemical and biological weapons as Iraq, Iran may be close to nuclear weapons. North Korea has sold to terrorists. But Saddam is seen by many as a less stable leader than those in these other countries.
3. A desire to reshape the Mideast, and put pressure on the Arabs to reform their systems, make peace with Israel, and combat fundamentalism. The idea is that with its awesome military power, the US can use that power to project its influence in an important but unstable part of the world, and force stability. This would yield considerable economic and political benefits. The downside is that it is extremely risky, and reflects a form of neo-imperialism that could cause an anti-American backlash around the world.
Saddam is toppled
On March 20, 2003, the US launched a war to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. For the first time, the US was actually engaged in a war of aggression rather than defense, and one that was not sanctioned by the United Nations. The US tried to get UN approval for going to war, but except for a small number of states (Great Britain the most important), most did not believe that the reason for the war – Saddam’s Iraq had dangerous Weapons of Mass Destruction – was credible, nor was an attack the best way to handle it. Rather, an attack might risk bringing instability to the region, may help in terrorist recruitment, take emphasis off al qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, and send a wrong signal about the nature of post-Cold War politics.
To many, the US looked like an imperial power, trying to dominate the globe with an arrogant, “if we do it it’s OK because we’re good” attitude. To the Americans, the lack of support from traditional allies and the distrust given seemed to suggest “anti-Americanism,” and a lack of desire to truly push forth the goals of democracy.
The war to topple Saddam was won easily. The Iraqi regime crumbled, as it was a shadow of what it used to be. But that also shows that: a) Iraq wasn’t powerful enough to threaten the region; and b) there were no weapons of mass destruction, the US was either mistaken or lying. The peace has not been easy to establish, and it hasn’t brought major changes to the region.
Realists might say that the US was acting like a revolutionary power, trying to alter the system, ignore allies, and risk creating enemies and causing other states to work against it (balance of power). Liberals might argue that this was a good way to try to spread democracy and markets, but should have been done through multilateral institutions. A new group: so-called neo-conservatives, seem to argue that liberalism should be pushed with force if necessary. They do not shy away from the term ‘imperial,’ but point out that this kind of imperialism is benevolent, designed to promote democracy and human rights. But many question if the means – assertive use of power, including military power – might not create situations that make their ends unobtainable, and ultimately weaken the US both in terms of power and of moral credibility.
Why didn’t it work?
The idea was straight forward: once Saddam was toppled we’d throw loads of aid and reconstruction money their way. How could they not love us? Their oil reserves would go to the people, and the people would be thankful to have freedom and a normal life again. Yet things went bad.
1. Old ethnic splits resurfaced. Arab Sunnis had the power under Saddam (at least most of the power and a disproportionate share of wealth) but are only 20% of the population. There needed to be a way to bring the Sunnis on board to support reconstruction. However, not only was the Baath party kicked out of power, but de-Baathification vilified the old elite, even those not directly involved with repression. It was used by the Shi’ites to rationalize revenge for years of mistreatment. Moreover, the army was broken up, meaning no central domestic source for order, and a lot of angry ex-soldiers.
Shi’ites then saw gaining power as their way to undo the wrongs of the past. Arab Shi’ites are 65% of the population, and they wanted to gain oil wealth and power that the Sunnis had held. So it became an ethnic power grab. The US essentially helped the Shi’ites, who won the first elections, and the Sunnis saw this as a US-Shi’ite plot to take over Iraq. They formed an insurgency to fight back, and for a long time tolerated or even cooperated with al qaeda, which formed in the chaos of the aftermath and had stoking ethnic violence as its goal. The US was surprised by this, didn’t see it coming, and took a long time to react. As late as 2005 Vice President Cheney proclaimed the Sunni insurgency in its last throes.
2. The rise of Shi’ite militias, especially those loyal to a radical Muqtada al Sadr. The Shi’ite militias battled the US in late 2003, but then struck a deal with the government. They have been quiet, but run the show in much of the country and limit the power of the central government. They are armed by Iran, and provide Iran with the capacity to wreck havoc in Iraq if they wanted. Iran also has good relations with the Iraqi government, and appears in a position to benefit the most from Saddam’s fall – Iran is Shi’ite, and had been a refuge for most of the current ruling class during Saddam’s rule.
2. Groupthink? The US seemed to think all of this was just a short term bump in the road, there was no real ability to recognize the depth of the problem until it had gone out of control. They had assumed success. They sent inexperienced civilians to organize society and government, most of whom expected the Iraqis to be ‘willing pupils.’ That wasn’t the case.
The Surge
In 2006 Iraq disintegrated into a spiral of violence and ethnic cleansing, as terror attacks on Shi’ite sites brought counter attacks. Hundreds of thousands were forced to move, cities became ethnically/religiously “pure” and the country drifted to anarchy. The old policy “stay the course” was clearly NOT working. Moreover, the Democrats made huge gains in the 2006 election, with Iraq fatigue widely credited with dimming GOP chances. Something had to change.
In early 2007, the President switched policies. Instead of trying to pacify the country and focus on empowering the government, the goal switched to focusing on al qaeda in Iraq (which formed in the chaos after Saddam’s fall). Rather than trying to get Sunni tribes to submit to the central government, ‘political reconciliation’ was made a goal, but the Sunnis were allowed to run their own show, even given aid if they went after al qaeda. While in 2004 amnesty for insurgents had been a dirty word, by 2007 the US embraced it.
That worked. Violence from Sunni insurgents has decreased, al qaeda has been weakened, and Shi’ite militias remain quiet, since the US has ceased trying to stop them. Yet the political reconciliation has not happened, the Sunnis are starting to turn on the government, al qaeda is still active, and the Shi’ite militias are as powerful as ever.
Moreover, Afghanistan has become more of a problem, as the Taliban has become resurgent there, yet we are overstretched militarily and don’t seem in a position to counter them.
So how can it end?
The US has lost a lot in this war – it’ll cost well over $1 trillion when all is said and done, we’ve overstretched our military and in fact aren’t as feared as we once were, given that the war has shown real weaknesses in the ability to use the military to shape political outcomes. Internationally our prestige is lower, and as the dollar sinks in value and the US economy sputters, it seems like the US place in the world system is weakening, Iraq might end up being a strategic error from which we cannot recover. Yet there seems to be no clear solution. How does one get out? What should the goals now be? What is a redefined version of ‘success?’