Comparative Politics
Mexico, December 1 - 5, 2003
Websites:
http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/mx.html – Mexican government cites
http://www.oaxacatimes.com/ - Oaxaca Times
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/?NLang=en - Mexican Presidency
http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/mexico/ - Latin America research network
The last country in our "world tour," and one especially important to the United States, and very interesting as well, given that it is undergoing a major transition. Indeed, one thing should be striking about the states we’ve recently discussed: all are in transitions. Partially this is normal – politics is always in a state of transition, stability seems a goal, but one not achieved very often. But these transitions are more intense than most, and when we sum up we’ll think about Hauss’ argument that the nature of the state is changing, due to interdependence and challenges to sovereignty, and how these transitions might contain hints about future problems and possibilities for politics in the future – and how it might even touch the US. But let’s jump into our final country.
Background
From a comparative politics perspective Mexico is interesting because it represents one approach, a type of guided democracy. It was a single party state, dominated by the PRI until just recently, even more tightly than India was dominated by the Congress party. Now that is breaking down, the first non-PRI President is in power (Vincente Fox), and Mexico may be on the verge of undergoing a major transition...but as it does, corruption and other problems remain more difficult than ever. If an oil rich country on the border of a first world power can’t make the transition to becoming a first world country, who can?
Some statistics: the urban population is 74%, a much higher rate than India or China, showing a relatively industrialized/modern economic system. The population growth rate of 1.8% is similar to India’s, though the problem is not as extreme as in India (though 100 million people is a signficant population, and Mexico City is a major metropolitan area). GNP per capita of $3680 is high, as is PP of $8120. Still, the gap between the top 20% and bottom is huge: $19,383 to $1427. As in other developing countries, development leaves an extremely poor underclass in place. Only 8% of GDP is in agriculture, but that encompasses 28% of the workforce. High levels of trade (a quarter of GDP as exports, nearly a quarter as imports), high life expectancy, and literacy around 90% for both male and female.
In essence, Mexico, like Latin America, is historically neither rich nor extremely poor. It has many resources, gold, mining products, coffee, and some oil. It’s Colonial legacy different than that of Africa; Spain spread administration of the Church, and the Catholic church is still important.
Mexico was the flagship colony of Spain. It became independent in 1821, but its first election (1829) was nullified when losing party refused to accept the coutcome and ousted the winning party with help of the military.
Dictatorships, etc. (Look at book for details) until 1911 when Mexican revolution began. Lead by Francisco Madero, urged Mexicans to go against the old regime. Civil war raged for years until 1917. Note the nature of the revolution: It was a peasant revolution in many ways, with groups like that of Zapata’s indicative of a peasant anger at laws that made it easy for wealthy landowners to expand at the cost of the peasants. Zapata, Pancho Villa (workers, rather than peasants), led a revolt that was idealist and radical. The revolution took a long time to settle; the major political and military leaders (like Zapata and Villa) were assassinated, and violence only slowly died down, but recurred through the twenties.
When it was finally settled, the new regime instituted impressive array of radical reforms: land reform, education, labor, etc. New constitution prohibited Presidential self-succcession, instituted universal education, restored rights to Indians, secularized Mexican society, undercut old power elite. Very progressive, forward looking system, much more "liberal" than U.S. The ideals were easier to state than to achieve, but the old elite dominated system (which continued in other parts of Latin America for a longer time) was gone. Landowners would never have the kind of power they used to, for a long time the Catholic church was hurt by the anticlericalism of the revolution, and the PNR (National revolutionary party) began in 1929 by Plutarco Calles and ultimately created stability through single party rule. Opponents were not supressed so much as bought off.
Lazaro Cardenas: Calles chose him to take his place in 1934, but Cardenas instituted a revolution from within, fearing that the ideals of the 1917 revolution were not being met as a new kind of inside elitism was undercutting the cause. Calles had to go into exile, and Cardenas instituted radical land reform, and improved conditions for workers. The party, now called the Party of the permanent revolution, or PRI, became the dominant party and solidified its hold in the thirties with the leadership of Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas could have continued as President, but driven by ideals more than a desire for power, he did not want to break the rule of non-succession. This ultimately helped, as it created a precedent that no other President dared to break; after all, if Cardenas couldn’t have a second term, what politician would be worthy? Economic growth was impressive from 1940-65.
My Argument: By the sixties when economic growth was decreasing, Mexico faced a crisis. The PRI had slowly become corrupt, and lost the ideals of Cardenas. Reforms stagnated, and the party held on to power less and less by actually popularity, and more by fraud or pressure. Ballots were color coded with the Mexican flag’s colors as the party’s colors. Village leaders would tell their people to vote for "Mexico’s party." Cities and villages were compelled to vote in large numbers for the PRI. Since it was clear they would win, they knew that low levels of support might endanger government treats. When riots broke out in the sixties and were put down violently, the PRI became a more repressive/bureaucratic regime, which held power without opening up perhaps twenty to thirty years longer than it should have. This has made changes more difficult. Note: this is similar to what we saw happen in the Soviet Union; Mexico was not communist, but was a state dominated by one party and its bureaucracy. This lends credence to the argument that bureaucratic stagnation is a real problem when you have one party in power consistently, and can lead to economic and political problems.
Counter argument: Yet even as I make that argument, I note that Mexico’s transformation started in the late eighties and into the nineties, the same time that changes swept through other countries with single party rule. This was, from the Soviet Union and China to Japan, Mexico, and Turkey, indicative of globalization and its increasing power. Perhaps that was the only thing that could force a change in Mexico’s power structure, especially after NAFTA opened Mexico up to new pressures from the south. Let’s look at the situation and think about these, talking first about Mexico’s political institutions.
Import substitution: Import substitution strategies, held until the mid-eighties, reinforced the elitist nature of PRI rule, as deals between business and government created an economic elite that literally ran Mexico’s economy. Though more dynamic than the socialist state control in the East bloc, it was not flexible and open, and hence started to stagnate.
The System: Mexico is a republic, with 31 states and one federal district.
Senate: upper house, 128 members, four from each state and federal district, six year term. These are elected in different ways to reflect state interests (SMD, PR, and minority). Chamber of Deputies (lower house) serve three years, five hundred directly elected to three year terms. 300 seats are SMD, all traditionally won by PRI until the last decade. 200 other seats are chosen by proportional representation.
200 a recent development; reflecting the erosion of PRI power. The PRI agreed to create those seats originally as a chance for opposition parties to gain more representation as the PRI was winning all the SMD seats. Now the hybrid system remains, even as the PRI has lost its hold on power.
Elections:
President: On July 2, 2000, Vincente Fox was elected. His party is PAN, the National Action Party. He defeated Francisco Labastida, who has the ignominy of being the first PRI candidate to ever lose a Presidential election. Ernesto Zedillo (elected in 1994) left office on Dec. 1, 2000.
Historically the President is powerful, but much of how things used to be done will have to be thrown out the window now that single party rule is over. Traditionally the legislature was under the President’s control, as he was head of the PRI. The President also chose Supreme court justices (approved by Senate), 26 of them, who would never rule against the government. Legislation would initiate from the ministries, controlled by the President (cabinet).
Clientelism: We ran into this in India, and in Mexico it was a centerpiece too (common in one party states): virtually every position in the bureaucracy and in politics was appointed by the President, meaning that favors were owed and loyalty demanded. You could almost think of it like a big Mafia family, where if you want something done you go to the party boss of the area, who can go up the ladder if need be. The power of appointment here was very important.
The President was like a dictator in a way, but since he was not allowed more than one term, it avoided personal dictatorship. Not only that, but former Presidents and others that were powerful in the party were able to use the lack of personal dictatorship to run the party like a machine, often influencing the Presidents (they would choose people they knew were loyal). So the power was often hidden (we saw that a bit in our look at China where Deng exercised considerable power, even while not holding the leadership position in either the CCP or the government).
Legislature: Bicameral system, a lot like the US, as the Senate has six year terms, half elected every three years. Congress has to approve all legislation, and that means that despite the fact it appears that the system has been Presidential dictatorship, one of the strongest Presidential systems around until recently, now that PRI dominance has faded, the legislature could assert itself. However, even members of the legislature are limited to one term (at a time), making career expertise difficult. But now the system is changing; the President must build coalitions, work with the legislature, endure gridlock and share power. With Fox the first non-PRI President (though Zedillo had to deal with lack of control over the legislature after 1997), the new arrangement is yet to be thoroughly tested. The next few years will be important.
Chamber of Deputies
1997: PRI 239, PRD 125, PAN 121, PVEM 8, PT 7.
2000: PRI 209, PRD 67, PAN 224
2003: PRI 223, PRD 96, PAN 155, Others 26
Political parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI
National Action Party or PAN
Party of the Democratic Revolution or PRD (leftist, led by Cardenas descendent)
Mexican Green Ecologist Party or PVEM
Workers Party or PT
PAN: National Action Party: right wing, pro-American, pro-business party. Fox represents this party, but has shied away from the more reactionary and nationalist aspirations of many party founders. It’ll be interesting to see how he manages with the Presidency, and its power (and it is a strong Presidential system) and the mixed parliament. In the last election, the PAN lost considerably, and the PRI and PRD moved ahead. The PRD had weakened dramatically by 2000, for awhile it was thought to be the likely top opponent of the PRI. With PAN weakness, it’ll be interesting to see if the PRI can make a comeback in 2006.
Clearly: The President will have to forge a new set of cooperation with the legislature, the old system won’t work. It’ll be interesting to watch how Mexico moves to a "real" democracy.
Interest intermediation: traditionally corporatism, with a tendency towards authoritarian rather than democratic corporatism: workers, peasants, middle class, military. (Example of Fidel Valequez: labor union (CMT) leader, but also tied to the PRI, died in 1997 at 97 years old, a symbol of the old corporatist system; he was the union man, supposedly fighting for workers, but part of the institution, close friends with PRI leaders. His death was perhaps symbolic, the end of an era).
The goal of corporatism: PRI controls each group, but uses them for interest articulation and intermediation. Even business was closely connected with government, often with links of corruption. This is logical: corruption grows with one party dominance.
Now what? The CMT is more open, and also there are challenges from rival unions, and real interest competition may be emerging. It is unlikely that the old corporatist system can survive, especially as it was more an informal corporatism. In almost all ways the old system was an authoritarian government masquerading as a democracy. It looked like a real representative system with split powers and federal divisions, and with interest competition. The fact the PRI dominated meant it was practically an authoritarian single party state with a mostly corporatist system. But now that’s gone. So how will things settle? No one yet knows.
Why did the PRI finally fall?
In 1968 student uprisings were violently put down. A more educated group of young people, emerging in a single party system, started to question PRI authority and were repressed. At this point, the PRI started to rely more on fraud and corruption than its own popularity to rule, and at this point the entrenched bureaucracy was becoming less effective and more corrupt.
1988's election was probably the last gasp, as the PRI "won" the election by literally locking up the ballots, and then losing them in a fire, making it doubtful whether they really won. The reaction convinced them that such a path wouldn’t work in the long run, and that they would have to open up more to the opposition. From 1988 on, it was clear the PRI was on a path towards losing its status. How long it would take and if it would be peaceful were the only questions.
Still, in the seventies economic growth, mostly on the back of oil revenues and large loans (which were given because of Mexico’s oil), helped keep the economy booming. When oil prices collapsed in 1982 (and loans could not be repaid), the economy collapsed, and the dissent arose yet again. Miguel de la Madrid, who became President in 1982, decided that there was one way for Mexico to break out of its problem: to abandon its economic nationalism, and move away from import substitution policies towards embracing trade and better relations with the US.
This was probably the beginning of the end for the PRI.
Economic nationalism had always been part of the PRI strength, protecting Mexico from the big wealthy neighbor. Article 27 of the Constitution, which vests ownership of all minerals and underground resources to the state is an example. Also there have been strict controls on foreign investment, though this has been changed somewhat due to NAFTA. Fear of US influence, a justified fear when considering the past.
By opening to the US, the PRI was starting to move away from its traditional appeal, out of necessity. Madrid, followed by Carlos Salinas (President 1988-94) brought Mexico into NAFTA, which opened it up in numerous ways.
NAFTA was a major challenge to PRI rule, and might be one reason why the PRI fell, and fell peacefully. Salinas signed the NAFTA treaty, and implementation was continued by Ernesto Zedillo (President from 1994 to 2000). Now Mexico is open to trade from the US, and hopes to make it worth its while by having its goods given free access to the US. This took away the appeal of economic nationalism, and made it harder for the bureaucracies to continue internally corrupt practices. Note: we didn’t talk about Japan and Italy, but these are two countries which saw similar sorts of changes where systems that were riddled with corruption and at the least cozy internal deals, with a dominant elite linked to business and finance, breaking down. Globalization seems to be a major factor. One could even see the transitions in Russia and China as part of this trend; the last class we’ll tie these things together and talk about whether or not changes in the way the world operates might be forcing domestic systems to undergo real transformations.
However, these changes, while bringing American financed plants to Mexico for cheap labor, also brought American labor organizers, and more scrutiny of Mexico’s PRI system. Simply, with openness to the outside, the PRI couldn’t run the closed (and corrupt) ship it had run in the past, it had to start opening up, and that created opportunities for the opposition and for rival labor unions and other interest groups. NAFTA may in essence have shoved Mexico towards more democracy.
Debt: One problem Mexico had was high debt. The oil boom of the seventies also led to Mexico going into debt by over $100 billion, loans most banks felt were secure since Mexico had oil. However, corruption and bad investment caused these loans not to bring strong returns, and when the oil price collapsed, Mexico almost defaulted. With help, debt reduction increased at a dramatic pace in the early Zedillo years, though a crisis a couple years ago slowed it down. Still, when bailed out by the US, Mexico has paid back its loans with interest, there are reasons to be optimistic.
Other Problems: regionalism:
Mexico has five distinct regions: metromex (Mexico city); New Spain (colonial heartland), Mexamerica (progressive northern region), South Mexico (Indians, poor, underdeveloped), and "Club Mex." -- resort areas where Americans go, wealthy, clean and not much like the rest of the country.
Yet the divisions between them have created something frightening to Mexicans who remember the heritage of violence from the revolution. An example: Zapatista rebellion (named after Zapata), under Subcommondante Marcos. He became a darling of the press and foreigners. Chiapas is a region in the deep south, which is very poor. The rebellion started with some uprisings in peasant and mostly indian villages, but soon because of Marcos masked secrecy and his articulate statement of ideals, they revolutionaries received romantic attention. This was embarrassing to Mexcian authorites for a few reasons:
1) the army unsuccessful twice, and also missed chances to catch the masked wonder;
2) it showed the deep impact of regional poverty, and inability of regime to handle such problems. It also accentuated attacks on PRI for fraud and corruption, perhaps hastening its downfall.
The rebellion broke out on New Years Day in 1994, the exact day that NAFTA went into effect. The EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Front) took four towns, and wanted the system reformed, with more benefits to the very poor regions. It wasn’t an attempt to take over government. To this day, that "rebellion" is still up in the air. With the election of Fox, there may be a chance for a breakthrough. The army is present throughout the region now, the rebels are laying low and waiting. It’s not as powerful a movement as five years ago, but still could create problems.
Scandals: Big names in Mexican politics have been named in scandals, ranging from the Salinas family (and many ex-Presidents and PRI officials and governors), and as the PRI loses power, its likely that new stories and evidence of corruption will come out. How the Mexicans deal with this will be important to see if rule of law will start winning out over cronyism. Also the PRI holds on to considerable tools of power, even if no longer running the government. Many ex-officials are seeing drug trade as a lucrative replacement for the perks of political power. These issues will be difficult in the years to come.
Discussion issues:
Model of development: In the days of the PRI power, many posited Mexico as a model of how you bridge the gap between third world countries not ready for democracy, and the dangers of authoritarianism. The PRI ran in elections, people voted, and institutions of democracy functioned, even if the PRI dominated. This created, proponents said, a democratic political culture, and people became used to voting. Yet at the same time, there was little instability, and it allowed the PRI to chart a path towards economic development and modernization. This theory was especially popular during the economic boom times before 1980, though criticism of the regime increased in the seventies.
Now, an interesting question emerges: Even if the PRI held on too long, they did bring nearly a century of stability to a region that had been riveted with violence, created a progressive constitution that worked to overcome maldistribution of wealth from earlier, and established institutions which were ready to move towards democracy when the PRI finally surrendered power. They accomplished land reform, which was needed, and created a sense of Mexican identity and nationhood.
Not only that, but under PRI leadership literacy and education went up dramatically -- some say that is one reason why the PRI finally fell, the public became smarter and realized that the system was corrupt and didn’t allow true opposition. To many, this is precisely what third world states need to do, keep central authority to modernize and grow without chaos and dissent, but do so in a way that builds democratic institutions which can allow for a peaceful transfer of power. The Mexican experiment was a success so far, now they just have to make the transition work.
Others aren’t so sure the model was a good one. They argue that authoritarianism tends to persist, and if it hadn’t been for NAFTA and US pressure, the PRI could have cracked down and kept power longer. Also, they say that if Mexico had been forced to start democratizing sooner: if there had been pressure from the outside -- then the transition could have been earlier or sooner. After all, the corruption still exists, and just changing leadership doesn’t change the way things are done. The transition is just beginning.
Where next? Mexico’s political transition does not mean economic prosperity is around the corner, nor is political stability assured. Answering "where next" requires consideration of a few issues:
NAFTA: Nafta remains controversial. Is NAFTA a help to Mexico, bringing in investment, making it easier to trade Mexican goods to the United States to help them grow? Or is it a way to make Mexico more easily exploited by the Americans who use it for cheap labor, and to get around environmental regulations? The debate is intense, but probably Mexico has no other path. Being next door to a superpower with a lot of wealth, the best way to try to gain some is to open doors to that superpower. Furthermore, NAFTA’s disadvantages may actually turn into advantages. If companies skirt environmental laws, that creates pressure in the US to convince Mexico to make and enforce tougher laws. If workers are exploited for cheap labor, more American aid to Mexican unions develop, as well as efforts in NAFTA to establish labor relations guidelines. Still, its unclear where this all will lead, and so far NAFTA’s benefits are concentrated in the north, along the border. Also, Fox wants to have an open border between the US and Mexico down the line, many Americans want a stricter controlled border; relations between the two countries will likely be very important and touchy in years to come.
Urbanization: Mexico City is growing dramatically, and is very poor and dirty. As it grows, more pressures will be put on the government to be able to redistribute wealth and provide opportunities for the poor. Can they handle it? Will the democracy be stable?
Mexico is important to watch. It’s either a NIC moving towards becoming more like a first world democracy, perhaps a model that modernization can work (albeit with help from a wealthy neighbor), or it might show the limits of modernization theory, as if it doesn’t work in Mexico, it’ll be hard to make it work in much of the rest of the third world. For Americans, Mexico is very important: over 100 million, with a growing population, living just to our south in a growing economy, this relationship is likely to only increase in importance. Also Mexico may be a gateway to growth and development in other Latin American countries, something which again could be very important both to the US, and our view at the prospects for third world states.