Karl Marx, of course, did not think Russia was the place for a Communist revolution. Marxian thought, as noted, saw communism arising from capitalism, and Russia was still steeped in feudalism. Because of its backwards monarchy and isolation from the West, it was a weak power by 1917, and when World War I came could not win a single significant battle with the Germans. It was a 17th century political order that survived into the 20th century, but could not withstand the demands of the modern world. Like the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, it collapsed with the first world war.

Note: 19th century Russia: the landed aristocracy was the administrative elite, holding both wealth and power. Peasants were formally freed in 1861, but in a way that kept them down. Industrialization came mostly from external development rather than internal dynamism. A lot of the problems we see in Russia today are eerily similar to those from the 19th century, but the stamp of communism is also evident.

The Christian Orthodox Church: One reason for the traditional conservatism is the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church (officially Russia was converted in 987) never had to undergo the transformation that the reformation forced on the Roman Catholic church. Instead of having a battle between the state and the church, the two meshed in Russia, and each held a desire to maintain the traditional social order, as it benefited each.

The history of Russia has also been a constant struggle between the westernizers and conservatives, but yet there is an undercurrent of authoritarianism. The westernizers like Peter the Great and Katherine the Great, as well as other Czars, tended to be authoritarian in their reforms, often because the landed aristocracy didn’t really want to go along with them. However, when the changes started to threaten the order, they were usually followed by Czars who wanted to undo the reforms. So change was uneven, and ultimately ineffective. By the time of the Communist revolution, Russia was a backwards state, far behind the rest of Europe, poorer and less advanced than even most Europeans realized.

The 20th century began with an undercurrent of discontent in Russian society about the rule of the Czars. Western ideals -- socialism, democracy, independence, etc. -- had infiltrated to the Russian educated class, but the government and church stood for stability and conservatism. With no internal reforms, populist movements were common. In that context communism arose as one of many movements vying for the hearts and minds of the people. The communists were divided between mensheviks, who wanted a gradual revolution, following the lines of Marx who saw a move through capitalism and liberalism before communism, and those later named the Bolsheviks, who believed you could do a leap frog revolution, jumping over liberalism/capitalism and creating a communism that would start in Russia but then spread throughout Europe. Trotsky, following Marx, believed the spread of such a revolution was inevitable, and many were convinced that WWI signified the end of capitalism, it was the final war that Lenin and others had predicted between competitive capitalist states.

The revolution itself had two parts. First, was a democratic revolution, which put Kerensky in power. That may have worked, but Kerensky failed to note that among all else, the revolution had been anti-war, and his decision (under extreme pressure from the west) to keep Russia in the war against Germany soon caused people to sour on his leadership. The Communists (dominated now by the bolsheviks) promised ‘flaab e mir’ or "bread and peace" and that’s what the people wanted. They took over in a shockeningly easy revolt in November 1917, and suddenly Lenin had power, and Marxist theory could be tried out for real.

A vanguard party: the Communist party thus became a vanguard party, designed to guide Soviet Society into a communist future. Democratic centrism would be the way democracy would be practiced. In cells or "soviets" people could debate policy, make complaints and suggestions, and send them up the system. It was hierarchical, with soviets at the neighborhood (and later especially workplace) level, moving up to the village, city, region, and final the Supreme Soviet, the top level. Once an issue worked its way up, a definitive answer was given, and all those below would have to fall in line. You could debate freely and suggest up until a decision was made, then you had to fall in line.

Lenin was convinced party discipline was essential to make the transition, it was too complex and difficult to do with infighting. But in creating that level of internal discipline, he created as well the apparatus that Stalin would use to grab complete and total power.

1917-29: Difficulties in governing and dealing with opposition. Despite having power, the Communists inherited a horrid situation. The country was devastated by World War I, and still way behind the rest of Europe. Beyond that, they weren’t accepted by the western states who feared Communism. On the outside, it appeared the party was loosening. Internal dissent and infighting within the party limited its ability to govern with one voice, and Lenin’s death in 1924 took away the symbolic leader of the new Russia. One of Lenin’s final policies was the New Economic Policy (NEP), which created a larger private sector. In essence, Lenin accepted that capitalism and liberalism had to develop before you could have communism (practically, he was forced to acknowledge at least through his actions if not rhetoric that without a market economy Russia could not recover from the devastation of WWI and the previous century of decay).

Stalin and the depression: Stalin quietly worked behind the scenes to solidify power. Despite the NEP, a strong and encompassing bureaucracy was growing to enforce Lenin’s idea of a centralized, disciplined party, and Stalin learned to play "bureaucratic politics,": make the right friends, know where the real power was, and then stab others in the back when the opportunity arose in order to move up. The same kind of game is played in any bureaucracy, including capitalist business organizations. But in a government like this, it was a closed system and the power spread outside the party and throughout society.

Stalin managed to gain power after Lenin by first eliminating the Left -- Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others who disliked the NEP or privatization, and wanted to actually spread the revolution (Trotsky was considered an especially vile villian by Stalin, who had him assassinated in Mexico in 1940). Then Stalin turned on the right, Bukharin and others who originally were his allies. As the book points out, 1929 was a turning point year. That year Stalin had solidified power, eliminated his opposition, and turned what was to be a vanguard party on the path to socialist paradise to a bureaucratic party designed to enhance and secure Stalin’s personal power through any means necessary.

* Forced collectivization of agriculture. This included the moving of families (and breaking up of families) who had benefited under the NEP and had become the most productive. It was an attempt to exercise state control over everything. It was said to be voluntary, but of course was note.

* Building of a vast industrialized society. Though the figures can be disputed, Russia did go from a pathetic loser in World War I, to a superpower by 1950. Many credit Stalin’s industrialization, even as it came at the hands of millions who suffered.

* totalitarianism: Stalin’s rule was not just authoritarian power, but an attempt to shape all of society, replacing the Christian orthodox church and its rituals with Soviet Communism and its demands. Stalin wanted to build the "New Soviet Man," and create a culture where the art, music, theater, and film were all ideologically correct, silencing those which did not conform. This kind of control showed a frightening aspect of 20th century politics - governments had the capacity to exercise deeper control than before, and it was so scary that it helped ignite a fear of communism that often became irrational. The reason for the fear though was rooted in a truth: Stalinism showed the extent that governments could do evil if not held in check, and the difficulty any populus would have in fighting it.

The politics of the Soviet Union during the "heyday" as they rose to a world power and achieved apparent parity with the US in military affairs are paradoxical. On the one hand the Soviets achieved what Russia never could: a clear position as one of the world’s dominant powers, the largest land army in Europe, and control over eastern Europe almost all the way to Hamburg, Germany. Yet at the same time, almost invisibly (but ultimately undeniably) the economy was crumbling, and the whole system proved to have been built like a house of cards. The more the stress, the more likely the whole thing would tumble.

Khrushchev overcame Malenkov to emerge dominant by 1957. The reasons for his rise and fall show some of the major problems in the system. Malenkov wanted to improve consumer industries, and made initiatives to the West to weaken the Cold War (there are still many people who believe that was an opportunity lost -- if the US had responded favorably, Malenkov may have had the upper hand and avoided the most wasteful and dangerous part of the Cold War. However, it was too close to Stalinism, there was anti-Communist fear in the US, and Malenkov still may have faltered).

Khrushchev: focus on agriculture and heavy industry, winning him support from the military. In 1956 Khrushchev’s secret speech was aimed as much at Malenkov as at Stalin, and once in power he tried to reshape things. Khrushchev, boisterous and hot headed, seems well intentioned. He wanted to increase participation, he wanted to minimize the use of terror to keep state power, and was something of a populist.

However, with power so centralized at the top, errors by the leader are compounded. First, Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms often proved disastrous. One time he decided to increase corn production and ordered many regions to grow corn and wheat, even regions in the far north where corn was not possible to grow! (In the US corn is mostly Iowa and Nebraska and south -- wheat more into Kansas, go to Minnesota, North and South Dakota and you see soybeans, sunflowers, and other groups). The result was failed crops. Khrushchev’s foreign policy blunders, especially the Cuban Missile crisis and his inability to get along with Mao, hurt him as well. China and the Soviet Union were each communist, but each had very different views of what communism was or should be. Mao and Stalin learned to tolerate each other, using each other for their own purposes, even while distrusting and even disliking the other.

Khrushchev expected China to recognize Soviet leadership, and Mao would have no part of that. By 1960 the two were openly feuding and the world came to recognize that communism was not a bloc. Many in the Soviet Union felt that Khurschev burned bridges with Mao, and such a dramatic split could have been avoided.

Most importantly, Khrushchev allowed some open discussion. Solzhenitsyn’s book "One day in the life if Ivan Denisovich" was allowed to be published, but in Soviet life in general Khrushchev tended to allow more debate, one could even say more freedom. He didn’t threaten the basis of Communist rule or the theory of Leninism (one could say he tried to revert back to Leninism from Stalinism), but his years were a bit of a respite, a more dynamic time in Soviet life.

The revenge of the bureaucrats: Khrushchev’s reform of economic ministries and the party attempted to weaken the bureaucratic elite (which dominated under Stalin), and this made Khrushchev some enemies. They also didn’t like the air of openness that was starting to be seen in Soviet life, nor did they trust his reforms. Many who rose in the Stalin years felt that Khrushchev was threatening the kind of strength and stability the Soviet Union achieved under Stalin. With the foreign policy problems, the military and industrial leaders, key to Khrushchev’s early rise, turned on him.

The lesson: The Soviet Union was NOT a country which could be led by a strong leader demanding support for the government unless the leader was willing to go to the extremes of Stalin to demand support. Luckily, no leader after Stalin was so evil and ruthless as to do that, and after Khrushchev it may have been very difficult for one to do so anyway, by that time Stalin’s methods had been repudiated. What leaders needed was NOT public support, but support from the bureaucratic elite, especially heavy industry, the military, and the party. When Khrushchev lost that (by ignoring or not anticipating their opposition or interests) he could not govern. Instead, the ultimate bureaucrat, Leonid Brezhnev, led the Soviet Union after Khrushchev from 1965-82.

For Brezhnev and the bureaucrats stability was the primary goal, the wild fluctuations of policy from Khrushchev could not be tolerated. As time went on, Brezhnev would become increasingly infatuated with foreign policy and ignore domestic economic problems. Early on, the "experts," the bureaucrats, worked to undo the experiments of Khrushchev, limit personal freedom and the ability to express ideas not in line with government views (not near as strict as in the Stalinist era, but tighter than Khrushchev), and decided to make sure that public needs were met.

The Soviets focused foremost on a safety net that provided goods and services to the poorest of the country, and tried to help those often ignored in villages and on the outskirts of the country. In fact, the biggest support to this day for the Communist party in Russia comes from the country side. They got regular plane service (mostly cut now), subsidies from the state to assure a decent standard of living, and cheap fuel and electricity so that winter life in northern areas would be bearable. They focused on education, assuring housing for all citizens, pensions for the elderly, and a type of security which they believed would assure domestic tranquility and support for the regime. Though dissidents were treated harshly, as long as you didn’t rock the boat you could move up in the party, earn perks and benefits (early retirement, vacations to places in the Soviet Union, etc.) and in essence the size of the USSR allowed them to create their own system that not only became stable, but by the late seventies had earned legitimacy amonst large segments of the Soviet population.

Looking at the USSR at this time, observers were tempted to say that Communism could work, at least in terms of creating an economically viable system accepted by the people and providing stability and basic needs. The lack of political freedom, of course, still made it anathema to the West, but those who argued that the system would inevitably collapse or could not function were a minority.

However, even as the Soviet Union appeared to be a stable world power: by the late sixties it achieved parity on nuclear weapons with the US and dominated conventional forces in Europe, being a major world power (some in the US feared it would overcome the West), decay was already happening from within. Meanwhile Brezhnev and the bureaucratic elite got lazy. They didn’t pay attention to changes, and Brezhnev became preoccupied with foreign policy and comfortable with the illusion that the USSR was one of history’s greatest powers. But internally decay was occurring, and it shows the weaknesses of this kind of system.

What are the problems with bureaucracy?

1. Initially, it can be very effective. Bureaucracies are created to deal with problems that involve making a lot of decisions or, in this case, running a huge complex country with a limited number of people. Early bureaucracies are made and designed precisely in accordance with the problems that they face. Thus, new bureaucracies are often efficient and effective, achieving more with less effort than was previously possible. Over time, however, they tend to stagnate and become inefficient. In a nutshell, this is what happened to the Communist world.

Bureaucracies have a few attributes:

Since bureaucracies are a small number of people controlling a huge system, be it a company, a university, or the Soviet Union, they can’t deal with each case as it comes. That is too time consuming. Rather, they develop SOPs. These SOPs can be an annoyance (examples -- student IDs and things like that). People don’t vary from the SOPs unless a major catastrophe hits. Even when they do they act with bounded rationality and satisficing. They modify an existing SOP just enough to deal with the anomaly, and don’t really try to figure the best way to deal with the problem.

Benefits: that’s more rational in total; a few cases aren’t dealt with as good as could be, but over all the cost of dealing with those cases would be too high, cheaper to use SOPs. Downside: a tendency towards conservatism. Things that don’t fit aren’t really dealt with well, and often forced to fit. No ability to really change the system, just modify things if absolutely necessary. Also, a tendency to grow and become more intense. As problems come up, new SOPs and rules emerge to keep things under control. Thus lower level bureaucracies can become large and cumbersome, but unable to be easily reformed.

Corruption: As the system becomes more cumbersome and stagnant, demands for change continue. Unable to go through the system rationally, people find ways around it, leading to corruption between bureaucrats and citizens, with friendships, relationships, and bribery often replacing official channels. When this stage is reached, you have bureaucratic overload and the system is perhaps beyond salvation.

Governance: Theory: "Soviets" meant collectivities, or small "cells" that would debate political issues, and send up their ideas. Called Democratic Centrism. Everyone listened to, but once the decision was made, it stuck. Solidarity while allowing diversity. Reality: Became more a downward information system. Sometimes you could really debate though. Make complaints. If you didn’t say anything "counter-revolutionary," you may be listened to, and cause a change. You could be critical of bureaucrats and rules. And many up the ladder would try to help, make a difference. Yet always within the system.

Result: Economically: relative stagnation. Not a hell, but not the utopia it was meant to be. Politically: Bureaucratic state, power in a few hands, clientelism within the party. Very important in understanding the aftermath. Psychologically: Lack of freedom and chance to make a difference led to a sense of dependency, lack of self-esteem.

People: taken care of, told what to do. No power over own decisions. Those who did have those traits, could move up the party. But if their independence caused them to rebel, they’d be shot down. Dependency, lack of self-esteem, fed into the system, and created a sense of powerlessness. Yet in some ways, comfortable. People would appreciate family life, nature, traditions. Little stress, little concerns. Very little crime, and the system tried to be user friendly as long as you didn’t question it’s basic workings.

When Gorbachev was young, he observed from a distance something called the Prague Spring. It had an impact on him, the ideas it espoused intrigued him, even though as a young bureaucrat he had to support the opposition. Czechoslovakia in 1968, wanted to make "Socialism with a Human Face." The Communist party would still be in power, but allow more freedom and pursue economic market reforms. When he finally came to power in Russia in 1985 Gorbachev wanted something similar for Russia, and instituted reforms based on glasnost (openness, more democracy) and perestroika (restructuring of the economy). Idea - reform bureuacracy, make system more user friendly, allow the USSR to become a functioning system with the good of the people in mind. Communism? Democratic Socialism? Unclear if he knew where it was going, but he knew where it was just wasn’t working.

Early on Gorbachev’s consolidation of support meant getting the bureaucracies behind him, and convincing the public he was a strong leader. He argued for rising the standard of living through more of an emphasis on consumer goods, and fighting the corruption that all Russians knew existed. But he could only move slowly because too much change would anger the bureaucrats, whose support he needed. He replaced upper level bureaucrats and started reshaping the Politburo, but ultimately his problem would be middle level bureaucrats who benefitted the most from the old system. Thus early on he was enigmatic.

Perestroika emerged as the catch word, a restructuring of the economy. It was necessary, but the Soviet economy proved incapable of restructuring. The problem again was the bureaucracy: it couldn’t reform, it either would dominate or fall. Ultimately, it fell and took Gorbachev with it. But Gorbachev probably did as well as humanly possible to try to make reform work.

Glasnost emerged as a main theme by mid-1986, and that’s when people realized that there might really be a change in the Soviet Union. Basically, Gorbachev choose an ingenious, but risky strategy to try to put pressure on the bureaucrats and gain support for the kind of economic restructuring efforts he wanted: sell it to the people. That is not what bureaucrats do, they try to plan and limit public input. This was a sign that Gorbachev’s rule would indeed be quite different! Ultimately, Gorbachev would learn that the public is fickle, and while getting public pressure on bureaucrats (the ability to complain about local authorities and make suggestions, open up more debate) did help promote changes, as the economy had problems Gorbachev himself would become the target of criticism.

Gorbachev was a master politician, and realized that if his reforms were going to succeed, he had to have a plan by which they could both alter the system, yet keep the bureaucrats on board. From 1987 to late 1989 he seemed to balance liberalization with a retreat from too radical a restructuring. He wanted to change, but didn’t want things to spiral out of control. The problems were straightforward:

1. Give an inch they’ll take a mile department: Opening a little bit created a desire for more. People started pushing the government, speaking out, demanding more rights. Gorbachev didn’t want to clamp down, so this was allowed, and it simply expanded. That led to some specific challenges:

-- many Republics wanted more autonomy

-- movement in Russia (led by Yeltsin) to liberalize further.

Gorbachev found himself opposed by a strong and vocal group who wanted him to go faster, whom his plan for slow change could not satisfy.

2. Bureaucrats revenge: the bureaucrats themselves distrusted Gorbachev’s proposals from the beginning, but they tolerated them because they recognized that the system had to be reformed. But as he went, they started sabotaging his efforts, not implementing reforms, and even holding back on some goods to try to build dissent against Gorbachev. In essence, his reforms were "sabotaged from above," perhaps they could have worked if the bureaucracy was with him, but he was challenging their power and their conservative status quo; that led them to oppose him at worst, and refuse to cooperate and do their part at best.

On the other hand, transition to a market economy is inherently difficult. You don’t have the mechanisms, culture, and system in place to simply jump to another. But if you don’t jump quickly, you can fall into old bureaucratic habits. The task had never been tried, and Gorbachev couldn’t accomplish it.

3. Hey, we want our vodka!: One would expect the common person to at least appreciate what Gorbachev was doing, but they neither understood it, nor did they benefit from it early on. First, Gorbachev saw the results of the "culture of dependency": alcoholism, lack of incentive to work, a general depression in society. Wanted to fight that with rules and laws -- limit vodka, force people to work harder. People didn’t like that -- take away the vodka, and you make yourself unpopular (each person was limited to something like two bottles a month). More important, the changes caused structural shifts in the economy which meant that goods became harder, not easier to find, and the sabotaging from above made matters worse. By the late eighties, Gorbachev was associated with worse economic times, and public discontent. People started to think things weren’t so bad under Brezhnev.

Note: Under Brezhnev things were collapsing, they just held it off. The problems that Gorbachev dealt with were inevitable. But people didn’t see that side, they saw that Gorbi’s reforms were creating hardship.

Why did he hang on until Dec. 25, 1991?: Simply: he balanced the bureaucratic elite off of Yeltsin and the liberals. To the liberals he said, "I’d like to go faster, but then these guys on the right will bolt," and to the conservative bureaucrats, "I have to give Yeltsin and the liberals some reforms or else we’ll have massive public dissent." Grudgingly the two sides agreed. Gorbi was a master at playing bureaucratic politics. That’s how he got to the top; that’s why he stayed long enough to make the changes so deep they could not be reversed easily.

In 1989 reforms in Eastern Europe accelerated, and Gorbachev made a decision not to intervene. He needed closer relations with the West to help finance economic reform (and reduce the need for military spending), and he did not think ultimately it was the Soviet Union’s role to be an Imperial power. So when Poland negotiated shared power between Solidarity and the Communists, and Hungary moved towards free elections (Gorbachev said he opposed this, but it was up to Hungary), it became clear that the reforms were spreading to Eastern Europe. On November 9, 1989 the Berlin wall was rendered irrelevant in a sudden and shocking turn of events which led to German unification within a year. By the end of 1989 Communism fell throughout Eastern Europe, and the Soviets negotiated agreements to remove troops. This wasn’t planned by Gorbachev, but clearly increased the pressure.

Response: lurch towards Democracy: Gorbachev’s response at this times seems to be improvization and putting out fires. He was under considerable pressure from many conservatives for giving up the Empire and giving the West a victory. He said the reason for it was to assure the success of perestroika, but the economy was getting worse. It hit a low by 1990-91, which created excessive public pressure on Gorbachev. He lost the empire and destroyed the economy, people were saying.

On top of that the Republics were demanding more autonomy and independence. Gorbachev decided to embrace change, since something had to give, conditions were so bad as it was. He reached agreements for a new treaty with the Republics (though some boycotted, and Soviet troops clamped down on the Baltic states in early 1991 as the West was preoccupied with the Gulf war and needed Soviet support), and democratized the Communist party. The goal: keep the reformers on line, while maintaining a balance and putting some old bureaucrats and those skeptical of reform in high positions. He hoped the economy would pick up and take off the pressure. Instead, the old bureaucrats and hardliners decided they had enough. They wanted to go back to the era of a strong stable central government, clamp down on the Republics, and end the experiment with perestroika and glasnost.

Note: Gorbachev, like Khrushchev, may have proven the inability of the system to reform. The mix of bureaucratic opposition and the difficulties of cultural, economic, and political restructuring simply create a Herculean task that would be hard to accomplish even in times of economic growth and foreign policy success. But the change inevitably would bring tough economic jolts and question the old East European empire, inevitably, either the old guard would reemerge (like Brezhnev) or the system would crumble.

Note: If the old guard succeeded, it could this time have led to civil war. Change in the Republics and Soviet society had gone so far they weren’t ready to get back in line, and the economy had indeed collapsed, even before Gorachev. I doubt a "Brezhnev II" would even have been possible.

The Coup of 1991: The Right -- old Communists, Coup plotters, etc. -- who wanted to keep the Empire together had made their best shot with the coup in August 1991. The coup attempt was a direct result of the new Union Treaty Gorbachev wanted to sign to give the Republics more autonomy, but of course was a response to all of the changes that had taken place. Unlike Brezhnev’s time, when most of the elites were from the Stalin era and people were upset with Khrushchev’s impulsiveness, the elites now were mixed between reformers and hardliners, and the Republics had a strong say. The right wing was weak, they couldn’t muster the force necessary to try to make the Soviet military keep the union together. Not only that, but the coup attempt was bungled as the plotters were drunk much of the time, and didn’t crack down hard. Was it a mistake on their part? Probably not, they probably couldn’t crackdown too hard because of the popularity and power of those who wanted reform, like Yeltsin. Ultimately the military didn’t support the coup, and Yeltsin especially emerged triumphant.

Gorbachev after the coup: It was over. Though Gorbachev came back and vowed to make changes, he had to recognize that he had become unnecessary. The right was discredited, and Gorbachev’s main basis of power was the balance. Yeltsin emerged by supporting the break up of the Soviet Union, getting the rest of the Republics to agree to form separate countries. Gorbachev, seeing the writing on the wall, resigned on December 25, 1991, the day that the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.

The key to success of any political system is to develop stable political institutions which operate based on rule of law not on personality or relationships. So far, that has been lacking in Russia based both on cultural factors (the Russian belief in the need for leadership, a residue of an authoritarian past) and historical (the nature of the old Communist system). This lack of stability/rule of law is probably the key problem, but its not easy to solve. You cannot simply create it without having the conditions conducive to stability and rule of law present, but those don’t emerge on their own. It’s a catch 22, you can get one if you have the other (stability/rule of law if you have conducive conditions, or better conditions if you have rule of law), but if you have neither it’s hard to know where to begin. Putin’s approach is to take a hard line. It appears authoritarian, but may be better than the chaos associated with the Yeltsin rule.

Federalism: The Soviet Union was a large multiethnic Empire, and Russia is a large, multiethnic Republic. However, one thing has remained from Soviet times and it has and will continue to cause problems for the Russians: how to implement federalism.

Federalism is a division of power between states and a federal government. The Soviet Union was in essence a unitary state, meaning that power was centralized in Moscow. Even the Republics who are now independent had their leaders chosen in Moscow, following Moscow’s dictates. While that has changed, the Russian Federation remains practically unitary system in that most districts and Republics follow Moscow’s commands, something which sets up a contradiction: the system does not function as a solid federation yet. In other cases, leaders have managed to go their own way more and assert more independence from Moscow. It is based less on rule of law than personal relationships and relative situations. Obviously, that is not a good foundation to build a system based on rule of law.

Also, a bit confusing. There are 21 Republics, which have half the territory but only about 17% of the population. They have more privileges than the districts and autonomous regions, and can develop their own state governments (though they are not supposed to contradict the federal government). The districts and autonomous regions have their systems approved by the federal government. So even the federalism is mixed.

1992: the New Russia: Though Russia officially celebrates June 12, 1990 as "independence day," based on a "Declaration of Sovereignty" from the Russian Duma -- a rather bizarre holiday since Russia is independent from a Russian dominated Soviet Union. But real independence didn’t come until January 1, 1992 when the Soviet Union disintegrated.

Economic transformation: Dramatic. Privatization was quick, with a voucher plan putting 70% of large and medium and 80% of small industry into private hands by 1994. But that also created problems:

The richest 10% to the poorest 10% has had an increasing gap since 1991; the rich have gotten richer, the poor have gotten poorer. An increase in income maldistribution was intense. Further more, the rural-urban split intensified. Example of villages in Komi compared to the city; but also all over Russia. Moscow and St. Petersburg well off, but periphery hurting. Its always been that way, but its gotten worse.

More importantly (and, indeed, perhaps a bit depressing), the move to privatize has decreased industrial output as there is no more market for Russian goods. That was especially bad in the 90s, things have been improving recently, thanks largely to high oil prices.

Yeltsin’s early fights with the Duma: Yeltsin was a former Communist as was most of the Duma, but as it became clear that the dramatic changes Yeltsin was undertaking both threatened the traditional bureaucracy (yes, they were still there) and were unpopular as they were hurting the economy, the conservatives realized that all was not lost. The Duma started to chaff at Yeltsin’s authoritarian style (very much in the Communist/Tsarist tradition), and basically decided that fine, if he wants a Democracy, he’ll learn that Democracy means dealing with an opposition who won’t role over.

The Duma fought against Yeltsin’s moves to increase Presidential power in 1992-93, and his support for Yegor Gaider’s economic reforms which led to 2300% inflation in third quarter of 1992 alone. By 1993 the Duma decided to try to impeach Yeltsin, which led him on Sept. 21 to declare that the Parliament was dissolved. The Duma then tried to make Rutskoi President, and a battle for power was underway. Simply: Yeltsin wanted democracy, but he didn’t want to have an opposition. He shut down electiricty to the Duma. They in turn tried to use the paramilitary units friendly to them to ignite a revolt. The army backed Yeltsin, suppressed the uprising, which led to new elections.

New Constitution: The result was a new constitution approved on Dec. 12, 1993. A new Duma was developed which would have 450 seats, half chosen by Proportional Representation, half by Single Member Districts. 5% had to be reached to get the PR portion. There would also be an upper House where the 89 regions would have equal representation.

The new constitution was clearly a Presidential system:

* the President appoints Cabinet members, but cabinet members must also have the confidence of the Duma.

* The President can rule by decree or dissolve the Duma, but only under certain conditions. Decrees cannot violate existing law and can be superseded by the Parliament. The Duma can only be dissolved if it rejects the President’s Prime Minister choice three times. If the Duma passes a vote of no confidence in a government the President must either dismiss the government or dissolve the Duma.

Note: the President can ignore the first no confidence vote, but not the second. He cannot dissolve the Duma within one year of an election, or if it impeaches the President, or if a State of Emergency has been called, or within six months of the end of the President’s term.

Let’s think about this -- where does power lay. Why do you think the Duma has to reject the President’s PM choice three times before dissolved? Why not just once? Well, the idea was that either the Duma can reject once or twice to show symbolic dissatisfaction, but pass on the third time to avoid dissolution. Or the Duma could surprise a President by rejection, thereby causing the President to rethink his choice. The latter was probably what the framers had in mind, but the former is what’s happened the most. The Duma doesn’t want to risk dissolution.

Both Yeltsin and Putin tended to run the government as theirs, separate from the Duma, a strong Presidential system. However, given the potential power of the Duma, down the line they may have a stronger say over the actions of government. Putin has hinted that he may become Prime Minister after he finishes his second (and legally his last) Presidential term. One could see the PM eclipse the President in power, the system is in flux.

The Russian President also has veto power. He can either veto legislation with suggestions for revision, requiring only a majority vote, or he can veto outright, which requires a 2/3 vote to override. The Prime Minister is in charge of economic management of the country; similar to France, the PM focuses on domestic issues, the President has foreign policy competence. The cabinet can be made up of people from any party or outside, though sometimes parties kick out members who take cabinet positions (the Communist and Agrarian parties have done this)

What kind of system is this or can it become? Well, it could become an interesting system of a strong Presidency with a significant check. However, in the first years of the new Constitution Yeltsin’s desire to use whatever leverage he can to overcome Duma opposition, and the divided nature of the Duma has created a situation where personalities still dominate, and where you don’t see a clear sign of how this system could work in the long run.

Viktor Chernomyrdin was PM from Dec. 1992-March 1998, creating considerable stability, even as he made enemies in the Duma. He was sacked by Yeltsin, apparently for his political ambitions, and then Sergei Kirienko was chosen. He was a very young man, and seen by some as a pawn for Yeltsin. He was also a reformer, and not well accepted by the Duma. Yet after rejecting him two times they accepted him a third time. Then when the economy collapsed, Yeltsin tried to bring Chernomyrdin back, but the Duma balked. They rejected him twice, and it looked like a showdown was coming.

Would the Duma reject him a third time? Some thought yes -- they were popular now, Yeltsin was unpopular due to the crisis. There could be a more solid anti-Yeltsin Duma coming back, and the campaign could arouse political passions. Yeltsin feared this, and finally Chernomyrdin withdrew his candidacy, and Primakov was chosen. He was chosen as a gesture to the Duma, since he had many friends in the Communist party (when he was chosen as Foreign Minister earlier it was seen as a move to the conservative side). Later, Primakov was sacked, replaced by Vladimir Putin. Putin became President (by constitution PM becomes ACTING President if the President resigns) when Yeltsin resigned on Dec 31, 1999. The election was on Sunday March 26th.

In short, its an uncertain system at this point. Putin may be able to institute the type of strong policies needed to return to rule of law, but its unclear. He has two pasts: 1) KGB agent, supporting Soviet Union, secretive, undemocratic; and 2) reformist and wanting to bring stability and economic growth -- not as corrupt as some of Yeltsin’s cronies. Time will tell.

usually means a stronger upper house). Putin has brought stability, law and order, but not really an end to corruption. There is less "petty" corruption than earlier, but the bureaucracy still runs on it, and his acts are often authoritarian and directed at his enemies.

As noted, Putin’s term ends next year, and the current Prime Minister, Viktor Zubkov, may run for President, he appears to be Putin’s choice.

The Upper House (Federation Council) approves appointments to the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, approves emergency decrees, marital laws, and any changes in territorial boundaries.

The Federation Council (like the German Bundesrat) has to consider legislation involving taxes, budget, financial policy, treaties, customs, and war.

Constitutional Court: Rules on the constitutionality of the acts by the President and Parliament; so far, they’ve been careful in using this power since they could be ignored. Also, still favors etc. involved. It could, however, become an important source of judicial review.

Candidate First Ballot Second Ballot

Yeltsin 35.3 53.7

Zhyganov 32.0 40.4

Lebed 14.5

Yavlinsky 7.5

Zhirinovsky 5.7

Others 2.2

Against all 1.5 4.9

The March 26, 2000 election, with 69% voter turnout:

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin: 52.9 %

Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov (KPRF): 29.2 %

Grigoriy Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy (Yabloko): 5.8 %

Amangel'dy Moldagaz'yevich Tuleyev: 2.9 %

Vladimir Vol'fovich Zhirinovskiy (LDPR): 2.7%

Konstantin Alekseyevich Titov: 1.5 %

Ella Aleksandrovna Pamfilova : 1.0 %

Others: 1.0%

March 14, 2004 elections:

Vlaidimir Putin: 71.2%

Nikolay Kharitonov 13.7%

Others: 15.1 (none above 5%)

Note: not only did they move from a second ballot after a close race, but even the first ballot is overwhelming. No real transfer of power, does not seem democratic.

State Duma (last election December 2003):

United Russia:37.1%, 309

Communist party: 12.7%, 45

Liberal Democratic party (far right): 11.6%, 38

Rodina (Motherland) 9.1%, 29

Others: 29.5%

People’s party: 12, Independents 18, vacant 2. Many independents and small parties have joined United Russia (Putin’s party) since the last election.

Thus: power pretty completely in Putin’s hands, it appears to be a single party state, albeit democratic (in a sense). This year’s elections for parliament – coming in a couple months – may not have OSCE volunteers, fears exist about rigged elections.

Alienation: Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Russian political culture is that of alienation, or a sense of non-involvement. The idea here is that "politics is so far away, what difference can one person make...they are all crooks...they’ll do what they want anyway...why get involved...its crooked, dirty..." Thus, if Putin creates stability and order, and the economy improves, then he gets support.

That kind of alienation is contrary to the type of participation and civil society needed by a democracy. People need to feel that their vote matters and enough need to feel that participation is important. At the very least, the governmental SYSTEM has to be in general trusted. Now it is not. However, that isn’t so much a problem of political culture to the extent that the people are recognizing reality -- the system isn’t working well and in fact these criticisms of government are justified!

1) the impact of hyperinflation. Part of "shock therapy" (discussed last week) is to let the market take over and set prices. This also meant trading the ruble for hard currencies and letting prices find a market level rather than being set. This leads to higher prices, and difficulties paying off debts and maintaining government responsibilities. One response to that: print money to make sure people get paid and that the government can keep up with costs. But...that feeds the fire, and soon inflation is feeding on inflation, and the Ruble went from an "official" rate of 1 ruble per $1 to a rate that finally stabilized at about 6000 to $1. Since then a "currency reform" package removed three zeros from the ruble, to bring it back to 6-1 (late 1997). A crisis in 1998 saw the value of the ruble plummet again, now it is at 24 rubles per dollar. (Was more like 30 to 40, but the dollar has recently been weak, and Russia helped by Petrodollars. US debt as % of GDP is about 70%, Russia’s is about 7%.

In 1997 the Yeltsin government, optimistic that the stability of the ruble and the new upward trend of the stockmarket, decided to push forward new reforms designed to finish the job and bring Russia up another level.

The proposals were dramatic, increase tax collection, change social spending, revamp the system. Perhaps it could have worked with a stronger President who hadn’t squandered his political clout. But it failed, and most reforms didn’t go as far as intended, or were sabotaged. Chernomyrdin, already in many dubious relationships, was finally ousted in 1998, replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko, in yet another desire to push reform. He tried, but again, there was stalemate.

Then: August 1998. The crash of the ruble. The IMF loans, since they weren’t working, made didn’t think they were in a workable transition. I had a few arguments with Russia optimists, the Russian economy vulnerable. I remember when I came back in the summer of ‘97 I said I who looked at the stockmarket there and the stability of the ruble. My view: there was no production, no infrastructure, nothing to allow a real economic boom. Unfortunately, I was right.

In August 1998 the Russian stockmarket, which had risen from 65 to over 650 in two years -- the best performing emerging market in the world, a place where fortunes were being made -- dropped to near 0. The price of oil -- Russia’s most profitable export -- dropped dramatically. Inflation -- under control since 1995 -- jumped up again to about 100%, with fears of another bout of hyperinflation should the government decide to print money to pay back wages and catch up.

Since Putin’s election, oil prices have shot up, and Russia, awash with petrodollars, has more money to spread around, and this has augmented an increase in governmental power and authority. But is it a move away from democracy, or is it a realistic connection with Russian history and culture?

Discuss: current situation and issues.